[redacted]

[redacted]

West Europe Report

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

[redacted]

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in [redacted] issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the [redacted] issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Subscriptions to this report (by hardcopy, microfiche, personal name, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, 1700 Shaffield Road, Chester, Ohio 44201.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

JPRS 75294

15 March 1980

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1552

CONTENTS

PAGE

TREATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

Socialists Challenge U.S. Data on Soviet Nuclear Weaponry
(Alain Jose; TRIBUNE SOCIALISTE, Jan 80) 1

Socialists View French Nuclear Arsenal, NATO Relationship
(Alain Jose; TRIBUNE SOCIALISTE, Jan 80) 11

Communist Press Views TNF Modernization Effort
(Max Leon; L'HUMANITE, 19, 20 Feb 80) 16

TNF Deployment Key Issue
Soviet Disarmament Offers Rejected

COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

European Community Faces Political Crisis
(Heinz Stadlmann; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 2 Feb 80) . 21

Franco-German Tank To Have 120-MM Gun
(LE MONDE, 7 Feb 80) 23

German-French Tank Production Faces Problems
(Gerhard Wagner; HANDELSBLATT, 27 Feb 80) 24

Iceland Diplomat Reports on Greenland Visit, Cooperation Areas
(MORGUNBLADID, 24 Jan 80) 26

Iceland Trade Ministry Agrees on Outline of USSR Oil Purchase Pact
(MORGUNBLADID, 11 Jan 80) 28

CONTENTS (Continued)

AUSTRIA

Fight for Freedom Party Chairmanship Intensifies
(ARBEITER-ZEITUNG, 3 Feb 80) 29

BELGIUM

CVP Congress Leaves Martens Little Space To Maneuver
(Frans Verleyen; KNACK, 19 Dec 79) 31

Martens Interviewed on Second Phase of State Reform
(Martens Interview; KNACK, 19 Dec 79) 35

Weaknesses of Belgian Economy Analyzed
(Jean Fourbaix; [illegible] PAST, 24 Jan 80) 40

Flemish Industry Loses Out on Tank Deal
(Frank de Moor; KNACK, 2 Jan 80) 43

CYPRUS

Communist Party Fourth Plenum Resolutions Published
(KHARAVGI, 30 Jan 80) 48

DENMARK

Armed Forces Commander Warns of 'Zero Growth' Dangers
(Anders Hansen; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 19 Jan 80) 60

Central Bank Chief's Warnings Continue To Excite Comment
(Frank Dahlgaard; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 16 Jan 80) ... 62

Central Bank Director Hoffmeyer Warns Danes
(Vitus Schade; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 11 Jan 80) 65

Bridge Between Sjaelland, Island Needed for Defense
(Svend Aage Nielsen; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 16 Jan 80) 67

Group Forms To Work Against NATO Nuclear Weapons
(INFORMATION, 18 Jan 80) 69

Government Measures To Enforce Savings To Affect Consumers
(Karen Voigt; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 22 Jan 80) 71

Finance Minister Jakobsen Reveals New Tax Proposals
(Liabeth Knudsen; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 20 Jan 80) ... 75

CONTENTS (Continued) Page

Finance Minister Jaakonsaa Discusses Wage, Energy Policies
(Ulf-Bertel Knudsen; NORTHERN TRIBUNE, 20 Jan 80) 76

Briefs
Energy Consumption Drops 81

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

FDP Coalition Strategy in Land Elections Discussed
(Friedrich Karl Fromme; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE,
8 Feb 80) 82

FDP Criticizes Antiterrorist Law
(Martin L. Quensind; SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 5 Feb 80). 84

Export of Military Tanks Noted
(DER SPIEGEL, 11 Feb 80) 86

FRANCE

French, U.S. Perceptions of Soviet Intentions in Afghanistan
(Jacques Guillemin-Brulon; L'AURORE, 20 Feb 80) 88

'L'AURORE' Questions Realism of Afghanistan Neutrality Plan
(Jacques Guillemin-Brulon; L'AURORE, 27 Feb 80) 90

'LE MONDE' Advocates Continuing Dialog With USSR
Over Afghanistan
(Editorial; LE MONDE, 29 Feb 80) 92

IFOP Poll Results Show Giscard Popularity Up
(Jean Charlot; LE POINT, 4 Feb 80) 94

Dissent Surfaces Within Communist Party Ranks
(Various sources, various dates) 107

Dissent Reaches Central Committee
Czechoslovak Human Rights Committee
Dissident Intellectual Quits PCF
'L'HUMANITE' Defections

Intellectuals, Workers Rue PCF Internal Dissent
(Various sources, 19, 22, 23 Jan 80) 109

Survey of Intellectual Problems, by Claude Prieux
Animosity Between Intellectuals, Workers,
by Claude Prieux
Working Class, Workers Defended, by Daniel Ayellaan

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

PCF Paris Federation (Fiszbin) Affair Controversy Continues
(Various sources, various dates) 117

Party Leadership's Incomplete Information,
by Daniel Dalbera
Release of Information Demanded, by Ivonne Quilez
Fiszbin Resignation Details Sought

Repercussions of Soviet Afghanistan Intervention Within PCF
(Various sources, various dates) 122

Pro-Soviet Split: Party, by Ivonne Quilez
Leadership, Rank, File Disagree, by Robert Fabre
PCF, CGT Relationship Strained, by Josanne Roy
CGT Internal Discussion, by Bernard Brisay

PCF-CPSU Relations, Significance of Marchais Moscow Visit
(Francette Lazard Interview; L'HUMANITE DIMANCHE,
16-22 Jan 80) 132

PCF's Fiterman Rejects 'Anticommunist Outcry'
Over Rights Document
(L'HUMANITE, 23 Feb 80) 136

'L'HUMANITE' Hits Media Coverage of Human Rights Question
(Guy Hermier; L'HUMANITE, 25 Feb 80) 139

Briefs
Improved Propaganda Capability 141
Cleared Telegram to Tito 141

GREECE

Political Leaders Comment on Yugoslav Developments
(KATHIMERINI, 24 Jan 80) 142

Stability Is Important, by Pan. Kanellopoulos
Threat From North, by Ioannis Zigdis
Balkan Cooperation Is Imperative,
Giangos Pesmazoglou Interview
Afghanistan Type of Intervention, by Ilias Iliou
No Reason for Concern, by Dim. Partsalidis

Economist Analyzes Inflation and Economy
(Lazaros Efremoglou Interview; BUSINESS & FINANCE,
2 Feb 80) 154

CONTENTS (Continued) Page

Balance of Payments Statistics Reported
(BUSINESS & FINANCE, 2 Feb 80) 159

Building Activity, Statistics Reported
(BUSINESS & FINANCE, 2 Feb 80) 161

Briefs
Karamanlis Visit to Holland 165
Talks on EFTA Agreements 165

ICELAND

Sakharov Exile Spurs Founding of Society To Aid
East Bloc Dissidents
(MORGUNBLADID, 24 Jan 80) 166

Oravdal Comments on Sakharov Exile
(MORGUNBLADID, 25 Jan 80) 168

National Economic Institute Issues Warning to Government
(MORGUNBLADID, 10 Jan 80) 169

Einskip Converts Ships for Heavy Oil Use in Economy Move
(MORGUNBLADID, 20 Jan 80) 172

Althing Passes New Gasoline Tax for Fishing Vessels
(MORGUNBLADID, 25 Jan 80) 173

Airline Chief Discusses Future of Troubled Firm
(Arni Johnsen; MORGUNBLADID, 20 Jan 80) 174

ITALY

CGIL States Union Policy After Meeting With Government
(Luciano Lama; RASSEGNA SINDACALE, 10 Jan 80) 181

CISL Research on Aspects of Trade Unionism Summarized
(CONQUISTE DEL LAVORO, 11 Jan 80) 193

Union Development in Italy, by Guido Baglioni
Economy, Labor Conflicts, Institutions,
by Guido Romagnoli
Recruiting Policies Summarized, Analyzed,
by Ida Regalia
Role of Union Membership Outlined,
by Mario Impolo, Guido Sacchielli

CONTENTS (Continued) Page

Union, Confindustria Energy Conference Seen as Unproductive
(Cesare Delpiano; CORRIERE DEL LAVORO, 11 Jan 90) ... 196

Confindustria To Consider Developmental Programs for South
(GIORNALE DI SICILIA, 22 Jan 90) 207

NETHERLANDS

Government Declares Two-Month Wage Freeze
(NRC HANDELSBLAD, 11 Jan 90) 210

Unions React To Wage Freeze Policy
(NRC HANDELSBLAD, 11 Jan 90) 212

SPAIN

Coal Given Greater Role in Energy Production
(LA VANGUARDIA, 19 Jan 90) 214

Study Provides Insight Into Catalonia's Industrial Growth
(LA VANGUARDIA, 18 Jan 90) 218

SOCIALISTS CHALLENGE U.S. DATA ON SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONRY

Paris TRIBUNE SOCIALISTE in French Jan 80 pp 6-11

[Article by Alain Jose: "The Logic of Terror"]

[Text] The Americans have managed to see the idea of excessive arming by the Soviets. Alain Jose demonstrates that this bluff underlies a frightening escalation.

1. History of Alarmism

Contrary to an idea widely held among public opinion, this is not the first time but the third time that the Americans and the European right have reactivated the arms race. And as in the past the paradox is that the alarmism, even the deception campaigns which can be seen by everyone, occur not at a time when the Soviets evidence their superiority but rather when they are weak. How can such a phenomenon be explained? A brief survey of the various stages of the contest between the two superpowers since the end of World War II makes it possible to evaluate its logic.

First stage--that of the cold war and the rearming of the West beginning in 1947. Under the pretext that the Russians had larger conventional forces than the West the Americans substantially beefed up their conventional forces in Europe at a time when their absolute monopoly of nuclear arms and then their crushing superiority made the "danger of Soviet invasion" impossible. In fact, such a danger has never existed--except in the realm of propaganda. Subsequently, George F. Kennan, who was one of the principal artisans of the alarmism of the cold war, of the theory of "containment" (the need to contain militarily the thrust of Soviet expansion) and of the "roll back" (or the forcing back of Soviet influence from Germany and the satellite countries), was to admit it, incidentally.

Then came the era of the so-called "missile gap," that is, the time of the legend of a threatening inferiority of the United States in the number of its intercontinental missiles. This legend made its appearance in 1957, precisely at the time of the successful launching of the first Soviet

sputnik. It was indeed a legend: The alleged lag of the Americans was purely imaginary. And how could it not have been? At that time the Russians possessed only prototypes of missiles and were completely incapable, because the state of their economy would very simply not have made it possible, of launching, as the United States feigned to believe, assembly line production of missiles.

Yet it is on the basis of this legend, manufactured by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and experts connected with the U.S. Air Force, that candidate John F. Kennedy waged his presidential campaign on the following well-known theme: "Dwight D. Eisenhower has placed the security of the United States in jeopardy."

Soon after he took office President Kennedy initiated the large-scale production of new arms systems: The Minuteman missiles (ICBM's [Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles] in ground silos) and Polaris missiles (on nuclear-powered submarines) triggered forthwith an arms race from the scale of "dozens of missiles" to that of "hundreds and thousands of missiles." In light of this one will recall that the Russians, very much behind, tried to offset their handicap by a gimmick--their attempt, which failed, to install tactical missiles in Cuba in 1962.

There is finally the present stage of deception and alarmism which threatens to challenged the progress of the SALT II [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II] negotiations. It is of minor impact, however, and for two reasons:

1. The SALT agreements do not in any case prevent the world from jumping into the race to build tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. In other words, these agreements do no more than manage, moderating it slightly, an acceleration of the nuclear arms race.

2. Neither do these agreements prevent the deployment of "Euro-strategic" or "borderline" arms which, incidentally, were excluded from SALT II. In still other words, the present deployments are allowed by SALT II. This is tantamount to saying that despite all the evident agitation, the two superpowers have agreed that nothing serious could occur at this level as regards their own security.

2. New Doctrines

It is worth while determining how much, at each of the historic turns that we have just seen, alarmism has served in the last analysis as a screen for the formulation of new strategic doctrines. These are doctrines which, at first sight, one would believe to have been produced amidst the pain and passion of public debates and fear of the danger of war. Truth mandates one to say that things are completely different. The successive elaboration of the doctrine of "massive retaliation" like that of "flexible response" seems to follow particularly dispassionate calculations and their implementation occurred as a function of macroindustrial interests.

PRESENT PROGRAM
(PROGRAMME
ACTUEL [1975])




NEXT GENERATION
(GENERATION
SUIVANTE (1980))
U.S.S.R.
U.S.

[illegible] generation in the early or mid-1980's. "The United States will be able to deploy MARV [Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicles] (there are MIRVs with a system for aiming their target at the end of their trajectories) that would enable an extremely high degree of accuracy both to our [illegible] and our Trident missiles (submarine-launched missiles succeeding the Polaris missiles). This will yield an enormous improvement by a factor of 40 (repeat factor) in our counterforce capability. During the same period Soviet improvements (MIRVs but not MARVs) will mean that we shall have an 8 to 1 advantage" ("The Vladivostok Accord," p. 11).



Fourth generation (around 1990). "In relative terms we notice that at this point the larger carrying capability of the Soviet Union's vectors (its large missiles) will yield it a certain advantage of about 2 percent, an advantage that is certainly insignificant since what are involved are projections so remote in time as these" ("The Vladivostok Accord," p. 11).

I. Where is the "bomber gap"?

In the present stage of perception the American right and the European right both have an interest in triggering public opinion with the growth of numerical data regarding Soviet bomber strength, comparing them with the ever increasing figures relating to the forces of the Western Alliance.

It should be recalled that this campaign is not new. It got under way in 1955 on the theme of a warning about the superiority of the Soviet Air Force over the Western Air Forces. This campaign was forgotten a little too fast after the start of the alert relating to the Soviet superiority in "theater missiles." One names perhaps tomorrow we shall also have a gap alert? If this were the case it would mean that considerable progress will have been made by the West in the technique of the bad gap and that this danger is perceived in advance in terms of progress supposed to be similar or greater in the USA.

In the face of the complex figures developed by all sorts of experts who have sought about their subject to demonstrate the artificial character of the "crisis" remain silent too often. They are either used by military groups and special [illegible] which [illegible] budgetary [illegible] slings. In [illegible] before the establishment of the counterattack that is supposed and [illegible] the [illegible], the political role of appearing as a "friend of the Soviet threat" having become the key. The PCF [illegible] Socialist Party[illegible] with its power [illegible] in 1978, does not run such a risk. Besides, as will be evidenced, all the sources which make it possible to document the alarmist scenarios are [illegible] from the United States Congress. The two will read them. The struggle waged by some U.S. representatives [illegible] senators against the [illegible] of the Pentagon [illegible] in close accordance with the defense of the Soviet [illegible] expansionism. The fact remains that the documents are there.

The warning regarding the [illegible] gap in a series "Listening" was given in 1971 in the report of [illegible] Senator [illegible] Bartlett's report drawn up following a mission [illegible] made to Europe. The report called 1971 the year of the conventional gap. This term was undoubtedly victor in launching the idea of a deficiency in terms of nuclear means, an "ideal" instrument for fighting conventional forces without [illegible] all that triggering a major nuclear war. However, as everyone will recall, the campaign in favor of the neutron bomb was lost by the Pentagon and won by public opinion.

"We believe," Senator Bartlett said in a meeting on 1 August 1977, "that NATO has not succeeded in modernizing and improving its conventional forces at a rate sufficient to check the increase in resources and modernization of the Warsaw Pact."

[illegible] and the Two Worlds Theses," Report of Senator Dewey F. Bartlett to the Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, 95th Congress, 1st session, 24 Jan 1977 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977).

[illegible]

involving serious warning [illegible] the [illegible] the executive continues upon receipt of a warning time of at least 30 minutes or a little more. Another is premised on a condition of 24 hours.[1]

But the appearance of such varied options is especially based on the fact that there is no overlap between the warning times proposed by the European and those proposed by the United States. The European countries are very partial to massive retaliation, and that changes the [illegible] of the warning time [illegible] response would result in the [illegible] of the doctrine of massive retaliation which came to an end in 1961.

The American orientation, coupling with European requests, studies in [illegible] the hypothesis of a Soviet attack which would be launched in an [illegible] preliminary reinforcement of both forces but would allow for [illegible] a total recovery of the Soviet fact and without any warning provided by the [illegible] concentration of a military or diplomatic crisis.[2]

The more stress is placed on a warning time of 48 hours, the more emphasis is put on the significance of the reinforcement of strategic [illegible] at the onset of the [illegible]. The more we must stress on a warning time of 72 days or longer, the more the Pentagon leaves increasing the means of an air[illegible].[3]

What can be said on this stage of [illegible] with the conventional gap is that it appears, if we place oneself strategically on the Soviet side, as the receiving by the European and NATO of [illegible] capable of launching a surprise attack against the [illegible]. The increase in logistical material "ahead of time" is known [illegible] as necessary to [illegible] effective action in case of Soviet encirclement with [illegible] strategy for the [illegible] of territory.

Warnings about the conventional gap [illegible] in 1978 were able to help put the [illegible] in the background of their [illegible], [illegible] which have put a new item on the agenda, [illegible] of the other—that of the gap in the field of theater nuclear forces (TNF).

c. Presence of the [illegible]. The SALT Agreements

All this does not happen, however, without a certain amount of paradox. This is the paradox which lives [illegible] the fact that the present crisis in the West when the two superpowers have just agreed, after 7 years of negotiations by their experts, on the existence of a [illegible] balance and by the framework of the strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreements. The Soviet

---

[1] [illegible], p. 73.

[2] [illegible], p. 71.

[3] [illegible], p. 87.

[illegible]

VULNERABILITY OF FRENCH NUCLEAR ARSENAL, NATO REALIGNMENT

Paris TRIBUNE SOCIALISTE in French Jan 80 p 11

[Article by Alain Joxe: "How About the French Bomb?"]

[Text] French public opinion is now losing an interest in it because it believes that none of this concerns us, that we are really outside the NATO dynamic. That legal fiction serves to isolate us. If the French understood better that the French nuclear weapon no longer serves our national independence but rather ties us to a European-Atlantic structure, they would seek to have allies around them in issues that would be worthwhile. Security at our level goes through general regional disarmament. This is a concrete goal and it is a goal of our defense establishment.

The fact that the United States and the Soviet Union should move between 1975 and 1985-1990 from the 10,000-missile stage to the 7-million-million stage raises fundamental problems for the French strike force, at least its ground force. It either becomes vulnerable or else it becomes entirely mobile. This is a problem of keeping up to date. The mobility of a ground nuclear weapon in a country such as France is not only a technical problem but also a factor of "political pollution." France's entire territory becomes a sensitive priority point if, say, missiles are installed on railroad trucks and the security of the deterrent force becomes the permanent goal which mandates an undesirable police state of siege on the entire territory.

If one wishes to avoid this choice either because of an advanced degree of liberalism or through a concern for democracy there are still several other options.

France must rejoin the military organization of NATO, whatever the legal form of this reintegration may take, by agreeing to place its strategic and tactical missiles in the Eurostrategic and Eurotactical pool, that is, it should make an attempt to enhance the French "contribution" by placing it as an original component in a general Western force vastly superior to the Russian. One then buys "security" as well as "a small sliver of relative autonomy." But then it is necessary that the French nuclear weapon become

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[redacted]

[illegible] SECTION [illegible] INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

[illegible] (AFGHANISTAN) FACE POLITICAL CRISIS

Frankfurter Allgemeine [illegible] in German 3 Feb 80 p 11

Article by Hans Stadtmann: "Brussels and the Political Crisis--The Differences of Opinion Emerge"

Text The Afghanistan crisis has brought to the European Community new causes of friction. In Brussels it is observed with concern that the positions of England and France are diverging from one another more and more on the question of the future attitude of the Community toward the Soviet Union. In addition to what the fundamental political orientation should be, the growing differences about measures relating to trade are also assuming an ever greater significance. The Community representatives in Brussels do not leave any doubt that they do not believe it an economic boycott of the Soviet Union. In them, the restrictions on agricultural trade now being enacted already go rather far. In contrast the British are ready to fully support even the policy of economic sanctions of President Carter. These new differences of opinion are taking shape against the background of the pessimistic opinion concerning the British contribution to the Community's budget--a problem which is not being made any easier to solve by these differences.

The reactions in Brussels to the initial economic measures of the American president against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were rather reserved. Only in the Commission was even in most of the diplomatic representations. The people in Brussels felt they had been rather surprised over. There had been no forewarning and no consultations. Here, the general view was that the network of trade relations which had been carried together over many years as well as direct contacts with the eastern bloc[illegible] [illegible] Mutual Assistance (COMECON) had been endangered. The greater dependence of most of the Community's member countries on trade with the East had its effect. Doubt about the effectiveness of trade-boycott measures also appeared. Only the perception of the necessity for solidarity with the United States led to restraint in public statements about reservations against Carter's aims.

[illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

FRANCO-GERMAN TANK TO HAVE 120-MM GUN

Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Jan 87 p 1,12

[Article: "The Franco-West German Tank Will Be Equipped With a 120-mm Gun"]

[Excerpts] The decision by France and the FRG to jointly produce a battle tank is a political decision following the failure of a previous attempt by Bonn at transatlantic collaboration with the United States and the failure of a three-sided European joint venture with Britain.

Preliminary estimates are for 1,000 tanks to be produced by two production lines in the two countries with a total investment of FF40 billion.

It is to be a medium armored vehicle (some 50 tons in weight) equipped with a 120-mm main turret. The turret will be stabilized, in other words, the tank commander will be able to fire shells while the tank is moving. The Franco-German tank will be equipped with night vision equipment (for night combat) and with a laser rangefinder. It will be able to cross rivers and obstacles as an amphibious vehicle and will be rendered immune to enemy nuclear, chemical or bacteriological agents.

The distribution of industrial responsibilities has not yet been decided. In principle the vehicle's main components will be manufactured by industrial "twins"--industrialists from each country on an equal footing. Recognized French and FRG specialities, however, imply a distribution of tasks which would give the design of the turret and the artillery to French engineers and that of the chassis, drive train and propulsion--probably diesel--to Germans.

CSO: [illegible]

GERMAN-FRENCH TANK PRODUCTION FACES PROBLEMS

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 12 Feb 80 p 1, 11, 16

[Report by Gerhard Wagner: "German-French Tank Marriage With Problems"]

[Text] Munich, Tuesday, 11 Feb--The switches will be set this year for the German-French combat tank of the nineties. According to an agreement of the defense ministers of both states the German firm responsible for that project will be established on 29 February in Munich under the name Mak-Krauss-Maffei-Sondertechnik (MKS), with Krauss Maffei and Mak in Kiel holding 50 percent each.

MKS will not hold an easy position vis-a-vis the strong French partner, the State Group GIAT, a French arms combine. Until the middle of this year an official decision of the Bonn and Paris governments is supposed to be achieved that will seal the German-French tank marriage.

This German-French project has three phases:

Finding a concept, development and maturity for serial production.

If everything will work smoothly, 7 to 8 years will pass until the first tanks of the new type will be produced; the first prototypes will probably be assembled in 1983 so that serial production could begin in 1987/88.

In all one expects a production of 3,000 to 4,000 tanks of the new generation. In the Federal Republic 2,000 tanks are supposed to replace the then oldest Leo-1. The French so far have announced that they will need about 1,000 combat tanks, so that both countries will need about 3,000 tanks. Further customers could be mainly Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway and also Denmark. The tank of the nineties is supposed to be exported to NATO countries at as favorable terms as the predecessors Leo-1 and Leo-2. It will be armed with a smooth-barrel gun of "at least" 120 millimeters diameter.

Naturally this tank will be considerably more expensive than Leo-2 which presently costs DM 3 million. The price escalator clauses alone envisage price corrections of 5 percent. The tank of the nineties will be built and it will show considerable technical improvements vis-a-vis the Leopard-2. Krauss-Maffei is optimistic that one will succeed to get a number of technical innovations for that tank.

[illegible]

COUNTRY SECTION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ICELAND DIPLOMAT REPORTS ON GREENLAND VISIT, COOPERATION AREAS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 24 Jan 80 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Iceland Enjoys Good Will in Greenland, Says Ambassador Petur Thorsteinsson"]

[Text] Ambassador Petur Thorsteinsson called a press conference yesterday at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with the fact that he has just returned home from a weeklong journey to Greenland. This is the second visit of the ambassador to Greenland in a short time since he also journeyed to Greenland for a week previously, before home rule, which has now come to Greenland after a plebiscite.

Petur Thorsteinsson said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had good reasons to study a greater association of Greenland and Iceland after home rule. His earlier journey, or the other hand, was for the express purpose of gathering information on land and people. It emerged from the press conference that Greenland is now ruled by five men and Jonathan Motzfeldt is the chief of them, as a kind of prime minister. On the other hand, the Danes take care of all foreign affairs of Greenland and Greenland is considered to be within the European Common Market. The total population of Greenland is now around 49,000 and 9,000 are foreigners, chiefly Danes. Petur Thorsteinsson also said that there are several Icelanders resident in Greenland and Greenlanders have also resided in Iceland for longer or shorter times, especially to obtain knowledge of Icelandic agriculture, and sheep raising has been pursued for several years in Greenland. Petur Thorsteinsson said that he, among other things, had talked with people in Greenland's government concerning fisheries matters and a proposed extension of fisheries jurisdiction in eastern Greenland, and in these regards Icelanders have been catching capelin [illegible] other kinds of fish come into consideration when Greenland fisheries jurisdiction is discussed, for example, salmon, prawn and cod. The European Common Market assigns Greenland a yearly fishing quota except for cod caught exclusively by the Greenlanders themselves.

The majority of the Greenland congress want Greenland to announce its withdrawal from the European Common Market and the intention is to submit the matter to a plebiscite soon with the aim that Greenland's membership ends

in 1992. Petur Thorsteinsson said, on the other hand, that there was much difference of opinion on the matter in Greenland as it was not clear at all how the vote would go. It emerged from the press conference that the European Union Patent has now attained 40 billion Danish crowns for the use in research for building up their catching in Greenland but what will become of this aid is still unclear.

According to Petur Thorsteinsson the trip to Greenland was made with the intention to Icelandic organizations such as the Central Sales Office for Icelandic Products, the Association of Icelandic Employers, the Nordic Council, Icelandair, the Fisheries Administration and the Ministry of Trade and Trade Relations. Petur Thorsteinsson said that he will report to these parties on the trip. He said that it need not be mentioned that there are new markets for Icelanders in Greenland and cooperation with Greenland in the area of sale of fish products, travel, and in many other areas could turn out well.

Petur Thorsteinsson said that Icelandic and Faroese people were well received in Greenland and consideration was being given to increasing relations with them. Greenland is very desirous of becoming a member of the Nordic Council, as are the Faroese Islands, and it has requested the support of Iceland in its application.

Many other things, said Petur Thorsteinsson, were discussed during the trip, such as relations of Greenlanders with the Icelandic labor movement, education of Greenlanders in Iceland, cooperation in travel, and much more. The Althing has invited a delegation of the Greenland Congress to Iceland for a visit and this visit will hopefully take place in the summer.

It emerged from the press conference that about one percent of Danish state expenditures go to Greenland, or about 1.3 billion Danish crowns a year. The Danish language is widely spoken in Greenland but the Greenland language is gaining ground, although a large number of dialects is a problem. All higher education the Greenlanders must go from Denmark but the development of education is now much discussed.

At the end of the press conference it emerged that 1,000 year old remains of Norse settlement have been found in the Vinland and it is thought that the first settlers in Greenland in that period from Canada. The year 1992, on the other hand, is the 1000th anniversary of the settlement of Greenland from Iceland, when Erik the Red once land there, and there are now proposals to commemorate this with a kind of national festival.

[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] SECTION [illegible] AFFAIRS

[illegible] TRADE WITH THE USSR IN [illegible] IN [illegible] PACT

Revkjavik "MORGUNBLADID" in Icelandic 11 Jan 84 p 32

[Unattributed article: "Agreement in Major Clauses on Oil Purchase From England; Around 200,000 Tons of Gasoline Will Be Purchased in the Second Half of 1984"]

[Text] Agreement has been reached on all major clauses with the British state company, the British National Oil Company, concerning the sale of gasoline to Iceland in the latter half of 1984 and discussions of Icelanders with delegation of the British company under yesterday in Revkjavik.

In a news release of the Trade Ministry concerning the discussion, it appeared that a purchase of 100,000 tons of gasoline during the year from the British company is planned but no agreement has been reached on the ultimate quantity. The British National Oil Company will make proposals to Iceland later in the year on the purchase of other oil users in 1985. Pricing of the oil purchase in the proposed agreement with the British National Oil Company will be in accordance with prices of the so-called "spot stream" market in Western Europe and the prices on it are considerably lower than on the Rotterdam market and, in addition, the "spot stream" market is not subject to as many fluctuations as the Rotterdam listing, which our oil purchases are based upon today.

During these discussions, which ended yesterday, there was movement towards final agreement measures and it is hoped that final agreement will take place at the end of the month.

The discussions in Revkjavik were over a two day period and, on the Icelandic side, were in the hands of the Oil Trade Committee and delegates of the oil companies and the Ministry of Trade.

[116]
CSO: 3626

[illegible]

[illegible]

> Text: Mayer Wertz, the former chairman of the FPÖ, is apparently determined to foster a successor over the party on an emergency [illegible]. He [illegible] launched a sharp attack against Dr Norbert Steger, who was nominated by a majority vote of the party's executive committee, after the FP of Styria nominated the state chairman of Lower Austria, Dr Gerald Ofner, as a rival candidate — as reported exclusively in yesterday's edition of this paper. A ballot vote is expected at the special party convention called for 2 March 1986.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] took a strong stand from all aspects and motivated him to encourage his candidature for the party chairmanship. The party chairman of Lower Austria was [illegible] to acknowledge ideological differences between Lugner as representative of the "national" wing and Steger as a "liberal". There was only a difference in the personal background. Steger is rather the urban intellectual type, while Mr. Lugner is not only a lawyer but also owner for 15 years of a successful installation company. Lugner put his candidacy in via the election of 30/31 In the event of his election Lugner wants to propose the Viennese FP deputy Dr Gerulf Stix as the party's general secretary. The acting national party chairman, Norbert Steger, made the observation in connection with Lugner's nomination that the latter was not even [illegible] as a possible candidate during the meeting of the party's executive committee. Lugner's nomination did not surprise him, following the discussions of the past few days, but however doubted that the new candidate had the [illegible] support of independent provincial organisations. Steger did not exclude the possibility of additional candidates for the national party chairmanship.

The supporters of Lugner announced that it will vote for Steger at the party convention.

end
Dpa 1151

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible] But at all. At most [illegible] 2 of the first one. It [illegible] provided for. The Council of State [illegible] the [illegible] itself has already evoked it. Should it be determined that if the [illegible] of the second, interim phase would not be replaced by [illegible] text), the regions would be almost [illegible] — without [illegible] jurisdiction. The Council of State notes: "In that case, [illegible] given to the regions will automatically revert to the State, [illegible] State, according to all the rules of public [illegible] reasons, we will [illegible] [illegible] the current situation of the first phase. This [illegible] the validity executive, the autonomy at the executive level, the individual [illegible] administrative act officials. The only problem raised at the [illegible] execution would be that the regions and [illegible] municipalities [illegible] the Council of Flanders] once again would relinquish the legislative [illegible] that have [illegible] received. That' what will happen in such a [illegible] case, but there, not exactly. Nothing is destroyed; everything [illegible] for an autonomous executive policy remains intact. The dissolution provision does [illegible] in an additional political obligation not to dissolve to [illegible] further [illegible] the definitive one. That obligation is really [illegible] [illegible] the attainment of that third phase will be put out by them. Now, the VU regions would like to see the current [illegible] entities are "replaced" by directly elected regional councils. I'm willing, but it would result in great problems within the small [illegible] political [illegible] [illegible] themselves.

Question: Thank you, Chris.

Reimer: And what's more, there is considerable doubt as to the "temporary character" of the second phase. The temporal character [illegible] exists, [illegible] the temporary [illegible] of the regions, the [illegible] place of the executive within the government, etc. The latter will "irreversible" [illegible] added because no special [illegible] to revert to other [illegible] situations, also after 1988.

Question: Then one of you regions [illegible] the Council of State "[illegible]" out? Then for a second phase which already [illegible] a not new establishment [illegible] of the State?

Reimer: One is usually afraid that the [illegible] cannot [illegible] be processed, even if the VU regions [illegible] a very regular attitude in the [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]. And, taken [illegible], one is afraid of an [illegible] because "VU [illegible]" without good [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] everything into [illegible], after all, there are [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] which [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the power will [illegible] [illegible], with what [illegible] will that be carried out, but how [illegible] a "regional law" [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] with the [illegible] law, and how [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the regions. But it is a matter of [illegible], of the [illegible] of an [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to the [illegible] [illegible], of a really determined [illegible] of [illegible] and of [illegible] agreement. [illegible] [illegible], for [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] would be

WEAKNESSES OF BELGIAN ECONOMY ANALYZED

Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 24 Jan 80 pp 19-21

[Article by Jean Pourbaix: "The Weak Points of Belgium"]

[Excerpts] In fact the [illegible] taken at the OPEC conference in Caracas call for a downward revision of the anticipated rate of growth of [illegible] percent in 1980, which then becomes susceptible of decreasing by half in comparison with the preceding year, under the increased weight of the petroleum bill.

The Share of Public Expenditures in National Production

This shrinkage of gross national product--which in 1978 (last known figures) was [Belgian francs] F [illegible] billion expressed in current prices and F [illegible] billion in 1970 prices--is all the more upsetting as the GNP has suffered from the deeper and deeper bites of the longer and longer teeth of public authority. It is edifying to take note of the statement made on this point in the study of the OECD:

"The burden of current expenditures of public administration (definition of national accounting) in terms of GNP continues to grow rapidly. It went from [illegible] percent in 1973 (and from [illegible] percent in 1970: Editor) to nearly [illegible] percent in 1979. The pressure, which had stabilized in 1975 and 1976 at around [illegible] percent of GNP, has since then accelerated and could reach [illegible] percent in 1979. This tendency towards an increase in the pressure is a phenomenon which has shown itself in all of the countries of the OECD in the course of the last few years. On the basis of averaged figures permitting international comparisons, we see that the portion of total tax receipts of Belgium (including social security charges) in terms of gross domestic product has gone from [illegible] percent in 1970 to [illegible] percent in 1977 and [illegible] percent, according to provisional national figures for 1978. Between 1970 and 1977, the last year for which we have complete figures, the average rate of taxation of the countries of the European Economic Community has increased less quickly, since it has risen from [illegible] percent to [illegible] percent. Compared to that of other countries of the OECD, the rate of taxation of Belgium appears to be relatively high. Belgium was in fifth place in 1977 and apparently moved up to fourth place in 1978."

[illegible]

FLEMISH INDUSTRY LOSES OUT ON IAPC DEAL

Brussels [redacted] in Dutch 2 Apr 84 pp 3-4

[Article by Frans de Saeyer: "Flemish Industry Has Lost Its Opportunity", message enclosed in [illegible] printed in [illegible]]

[Text] The decision has now been made to negotiate and conclude in the next few days the definitive contract for the assembly in Belgium of around [illegible] armored personnel carriers. There is a year of political-industrial retrospection.

On 21 December 1983 the council of ministers finally authorized Minister of Defense Leo Delcroix (PSC [Social Christian Party]) to negotiate and conclude the definitive contract with [illegible], the Belgian Mechanical Construction (Ateliers Metallurgiques de Tubize, Cockerill and Brussels Lambert) with whom the government had already been negotiating since the council of ministers' meeting on 24 July for the (partial) assembly in Belgium of [illegible] American AIFV and M113 armored personnel carriers on tracks, to the exclusion of other candidates. The Leuven company Aerts had acquired the construction permit for that area as early as September 1983 from the American Food Machinery Corporation, FMC, in San Jose. Now that the final negotiations with [illegible] are starting -- and the government in connection with this purchase has to register in public only the [three] reports by the [High Committee of Control] in connection with past contracts between Aerts and National Defense, as Prime Minister Martens promised after the council of ministers' meeting of 21 December -- a first series of final considerations can already emerge in an urgent [illegible] with [illegible] whose approximate amount was set at 14 billion [Belgian] francs.

First and foremost, the ministers-technicians, in primarily strategic discussion of the question of whether during the next 20 years we will need our soldiers after the Benelux have still their vehicles or vehicles on wheels that can [illegible] as possible. The non-definitive choice of armored personnel carriers on tracks certainly is connected with the [illegible] in order [illegible] Belgian troops [illegible] FRG, but it is not certain that the carrying out of these tasks will require the same. In that context we have already referred here sufficiently to [illegible] and

[illegible]

[illegible]

[redacted]

To back up these warnings the Soviets have been strongly reinforcing their contingents stationed on the borders with Pakistan in the past 48 hours.

However these facts are not enough to convince [illegible] advocates [illegible].

Those who [illegible] by the sole solution of Afghanistan's neutralisation are giving way to the most unrealistic of comparisons.

They are quite simply trying to compare the Afghan affair to Austria's neutralisation, embodied in the state treaty signed in Vienna on 15 March 1955 by the four great powers.

However there is absolutely no comparison between the two situations aside from their totally dissimilar [illegible].

In Kabul the USSR is the sole decisionmaking power.

In Vienna, the Soviets, Americans, British and French who jointly occupied Austria had of necessity to draw up a draft agreement together if they wished to withdraw from the country.

The neutralisation was the result of a series of compromises and, moreover, Moscow played a very skillful game.

The birth of a neutral Austria created a gaping hole in the middle of NATO's Central European defense system.

Soviet forces present in Budapest at the time and particularly in Prague since 1968, could occupy Austrian territory within a few hours, as almost happened in August 1968 during the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The Soviets have two penetration routes: Linz-Salzburg if they wished to outflank Bavaria, Linz-Graz-Klagenfurt if they wanted to complete the encirclement of Yugoslavia.

The second case would be an improved version of the famous "Polarka" plan revealed by Gen Jan Sejna after he fled to the United States following the failure of the Prague Spring.

This is a far cry from Afghanistan.

However although very different, the two cases share one fundamental point: Moscow's desire for strategic zones favorable to its expansionist policy.

So, instead of praising its advantages in the abstract, perhaps we should first ask this question: What kind of neutralisation?

CSO: [illegible]

LE MONDE ADVOCATES CONTINUING DIALOG WITH USSR OVER AFGHANISTAN

[illegible] Paris LE MONDE in French [illegible] Feb 80 p 1 [illegible]

[Editorial: "Neutralization of Kabul"]

[Text] Has an indirect U.S.-USSR dialog been started on the eventual "neutralization" of Afghanistan, an idea timidly launched last week by the nine's foreign ministers? The question can justifiably be put after two recent events. On the one hand, Mr Brezhnev's 22 February speech in which the Soviet number-one seemed to link the Red Army's retreat from Afghanistan with U.S. guarantees; and, on the other hand, Mr Carter's message to Marshal Tito at the start of the week, when the White House leader came round to the idea of Afghan "neutrality."

It is all the more justifiable to question Moscow's real intentions since the diplomatic, political and military balance of its intervention is now particularly negative. The USSR has been condemned by 104 states at the United Nations and by the Islamabad Islamic conference. Mr Gromyko's trip to India--a vital country in the Kremlin's Asian strategy--ended in semi-failure, with Mrs Gandhi refusing to stand surety for the Soviet advance after condemning it in principle in the Franco-Indian statement signed with Mr Giscard d'Estaing. Moscow's relations with the Third World and the nonaligned movement have deteriorated; the U.S. dialog has been broken, thereby risking a dangerous resumption of the arms race and seriously questioning whether the Olympics will be held in the USSR this summer. Europe stands aloof, even if in different degrees and even though the common objective of all its governments is still to ensure a Soviet withdrawal. Finally, the intervention has considerably accelerated the China-U.S. rapprochement, which was precisely what the USSR wanted to avoid.

Militarily, the balance is hardly more encouraging, since the Red Army's objectives have not been and probably will not be attained without a significant increase in the number of men involved. The Soviets do not have complete control of either the cities or the principal lines of communication, nor even of the northern route by which their supply convoys arrive. As for the political balance, the recent brutally suppressed Kabul riots showed the population's true sympathies, if that was necessary.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] by Jean Stoetzel, Professeur, Paris Political Studies Institute. [illegible] "The Left Going Down"

[illegible] This is the second public opinion survey by the IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute] since it published an IFOP presidential election [illegible] the earlier one [illegible] in this January 1978, it involves two different surveys. The first one deals with the image of politicians [illegible]. It was prepared between 10 and 21 January 1978 with a representative sample of 911 French citizens of 18 and over. The second one deals with how the French intend to vote [illegible] responses received at the corresponding time [illegible] and second round in the presidential elections. It was conducted on three successive weeks between 7 and 21 January 1978, based on a representative sample of 1,081 French citizens of 18 and over. The IFOP and AP Polls selected such a large sample not at least in order to increase the reliability of this survey but rather to be able to come up with a more refined analysis of the differences between the various categories of voters and the evolving of votes during coming surveys. To recall the results of the earlier survey, conducted in December 1977, in connection with the various questions [illegible] of course does not apply to the assumptions in which Raymond Barre stood up because he was not included in our first public opinion survey. We decided on a matter of fact to introduce the premier into this new survey since we cannot rule out the possibility that he might run it, for any reason whatsoever. Will Valery Giscard d'Estaing would not run for President.

[illegible] It is that the shadow cast by Barre is spreading over the presidential election landscape. The left is definitely slipping when compared to the IFOP [illegible] survey of last December. It is odd to find the

[illegible] are most likely [illegible] voters on basis of presidential [illegible] question 6). They are also open to some of Rocard's [illegible] 35 percent of the Socialist and left-wing radicals would vote for Chirac, while Rocard and 15 percent reject Mitterrand (question 4).

Recently shares of minority grew faster than those of Mitterrand (but exceeding [illegible] the Socialist and radical left-wing voters. Mitterrand to prevent his election during the last week (question 7).

Our tests in the data [illegible] and Mitterrand [illegible] has polarized the [illegible] the use of neutrality and intensity radicals in the "neutral" president. 9 percent are for Rocard and 20 percent are for Mitterrand today, or against 21 percent for Rocard and 17 percent for Mitterrand last October. That could point to a possible upset for Mitterrand [illegible] Rocard all the way into the socialist and radical left-wing electorate.

3. [illegible] Rising Interest

We can personally [illegible] that the presidential election campaign

	[illegible]
[illegible]	47% 41%
[illegible]	33% 7%
[illegible]	9% 5%
[illegible]	11% 47%

Key: [illegible] under way, [illegible] the major problem, [illegible] on their or all, [illegible] the response, [illegible] November 1979 for comparison.

Among all voters, the feeling that the presidential campaign is already off the ground was strong in November but had grown stronger since. The voters [illegible] in the leftmost positions personally are the ones least in a hurry to have the enter the campaign, perhaps[illegible]. Only 12 percent of the UDF [French conservative Union] voters, the campaign is "already under way," as against 47 percent of the RPR [Gaullist] for the Republic] voters, 54 percent for the [illegible] Parti[illegible] Radical Left-wing Movement voters, and 53 percent of the P[illegible] Party/ voters.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

In your opinion, was it the candidate who [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

In your opinion, was it the candidate who [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]



[illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

This overall review is generally positive ([illegible] percent against [illegible] percent, in other words, [illegible]) whereas it was slightly negative ([illegible]) last November. This change in the situation which is favorable to the president is mostly due to the socialist voters (as many satisfied voters as dissatisfied voters today, instead of [illegible] percent critical evaluation as against [illegible] percent positive evaluation in November). This is also tied to a certain rally among the [illegible] (from [illegible] in November to [illegible]).

Voting Intention

Responses for 100 French answering questions.

(Key: 1--Ecologist candidate; 2--Left-wing Radical; 3--Left-wing extremist; *--November 1979 for comparison. Hypothese--Hypothesis. PSU (United Socialist Party)).

First Round

Suppose that you had to choose between the following candidates in the next presidential election. Whom would you be most likely to vote for?

Hypothèse 1	[illegible]	Rappel nov. 79
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing	40 %	39 %
Jacques Chirac	12 %	12 %
François Mitterrand	19 %	20 %
Georges Marchais	16 %	16 %
Un candidat écologiste (1)	7 %	7 %
Un radical de gauche (2)	1 %	2 %
H. Bouchardeau (PSU)	1 %	—
Roger Garaudy	1 %	1 %
J.-M. Le Pen (Front nat.)	1 %	1 %
Pascal Gauchon (PFN)	—	
Un extrême gauche (3)	2 %	2 %

Hypothèse 2	[illegible]	Rappel nov. 79
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing	38 %	39 %
Jacques Chirac	12 %	12 %
Michel Rocard	21 %	22 %
Georges Marchais	16 %	17 %
Un candidat écologiste (1)	6 %	7 %
Un radical de gauche (2)	1 %	1 %
H. Bouchardeau (PSU)	2 %	—
Roger Garaudy	1 %	1 %
J.-M. Le Pen (Front nat.)	1 %	1 %
Pascal Gauchon (PFN)	—	
Un extrême gauche (3)	2 %	2 %

[illegible] Barre [illegible] Hypothesis 2 of the Historical Hypothesis 1), the Socialist Party would reduce its own Gaullist vote [illegible] less for Mitterrand, 2% less for Barre):

Hypothesis 3	(a)	[illegible] %
[illegible]	45%	45%
[illegible]	25%	25%
[illegible]	15%	15%
[illegible]	7%	6%
[illegible]	2%	2%
[illegible]	2%	
[illegible]	1%	2%
[illegible]	2%	1%
[illegible]		
[illegible]	2%	2%

Hypothesis 4	(a)	[illegible] %
[illegible]	45%	45%
[illegible]	27%	27%
[illegible]	17%	16%
[illegible]	7%	6%
[illegible]	2%	2%
[illegible]	2%	
[illegible]	1%	2%
[illegible]	2%	1%
[illegible]		
[illegible]	2%	2%

(a) Assumes vote for self-declared candidate, by which, on 19th November, got less votes during the first round than if it were a choice between Giscard and Chirac. (b) points less against Mitterrand, 1 points less against Barre). Under all assumptions, however Giscard is advancing and the left is losing ground as compared to November 1978.

The replacement of Giscard with Barre, an Giscardian candidate, greatly increases the indecision on the part of the voters, the chances of Chirac qualifying for the second round, and the total score of the left-wing candidates, regardless of who the socialist candidate may happen to be.

Second Round

Let us assume that we are in the second round of presidential elections. For which of the candidates would you be most likely to vote?

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Party [redacted] in Prague (Dec. 79 p. 34

Text: The dispute which has for a while been exciting the [redacted] party public, expressed by a long resolution, has received new impetus. The Prague affair and the settlement of accounts in the subject of the Party Federation have finally exhausted the patience of the "liberals."

At the present level there is astonishment that the "normal" [redacted] promised at the last congress has not gone beyond the stage of speeches on the desirable development of the party, i.e., the stage of good wishes. The situation has reached the top of the communal pyramid. Thus, in the recent sessions of the Central Committee Charles Fiterman, member [redacted] of the PCF is said to have headed this objecting movement favoring the institution of real democracy within the party.

[redacted]

Paris [redacted] in French 11 Jan 80 p 1

Text: Following the action started with the appeal of the French [redacted] opposing the trial of the citizen in Prague (LF [redacted] 19 December), 29 well intentioned persons decided to organize a committee for the defense of freedom and human rights in Czechoslovakia. The committee is open to anyone who, within the framework of support of activities, shares this aim.

The following are members of the committee:

Alexandre Adler, historian, [redacted] Author; Jean Baudot, professeur; Andre Gorlier, writer; Gerard Jaunion, TV producer; Jean Lacouture, [redacted]

---

1 [redacted] 2 [redacted] 19[redacted] Due to [redacted] Party.

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Issues of Intellectual Problems

Paris [illegible] de France 21 Jan 84 p 1

[Article by Claude Frioux]

Text In Saturday, 14 January, Claude Frioux participated in the evening sponsored by [illegible] on the attitude of PCF toward socialism. He believes that the resolutions to be considered in 1984 and in February by the national council of the PCF should "contribute to deepen, once and for all, the long anti-intellectualism of our objective ground and of an ever-age legitimacy."

The three president of the University of Vincennes, noted that, "This evolution and its anti-intellectual implications contrast to range of proposals and the thoroughly reassuring new policy. They are a far greater danger than the position by 'socialism' which hardly even existed who, apparently, are ready to abandon it - political direction following a new different from that of a theoretic which controls a minority." He Frioux went on to say the following:

"Serious ideas are piling up: anticommunism (the effort of the Paris federation), a denial (rejection of the proletariat as a body of basic like basic affairs), frequent inability to progress and [illegible] beyond the dimension of existing contradictions without socialist either contradiction or by remaining silent; considered as the only form of alienation within the affairs of [illegible] and alienation; the PCF[illegible], failing to explain the nature of difference caused by the [illegible] and [illegible] contradictions of the [illegible] and its consequences. Strictly out of history. We have witnessed the rediscovering of all the old [illegible] ideas, once again raised to the level of absolutes. To end [illegible] the opponent, to end [illegible] of the essential. To [illegible] the order, and [illegible] impression of never having been wrong."

---

1. Interviewed by Le Matin and [illegible] had expressed "satisfaction [illegible] on the PCF (Le [illegible] 7 December

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

PCF PARIS FEDERATION 'FIGARO' AFFAIR CONTROVERSY CONTINUES

Party Leadership's Incomplete Information

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 21 Jan 80 p 7

[Article by Claude Delbera, [illegible]-Bonneuil cell, Haute-de-Belleville section, Paris federation: "Mutilated Information"]

[Text] I have just read Claude Prieux' contribution in the forum L'HUMANITE, 19 January.

I do not share the opinion he expresses concerning our action. My immediate reaction, however, as with respect to the arguments used without further explanation, as if it went without saying, Claude Prieux speaks of "mutilated information" in the "Paris federation affair." Such an assertion cannot be overlooked; it is absolutely inaccurate.

I shall not bring up the main issue again. L'HUMANITE has given an account of it on several occasions. But I take exception to any reproach of disorganization. As a Paris federation leader, I have taken part in the federal committee meetings where, in the presence of Henri Fiszbin and comrades sharing his opinion, the disagreement which occurred following the meeting of the political bureau and of the Paris federation secretariat on 11 January 1979 has been extensively discussed. I have taken part in section and cell committee meetings, and in the conference for my arrondissement. I have had to state all these problems on numerous occasions. I have heard other comrades doing the same.

I want to state emphatically, and thousands of communists could do it as well as I, that the information provided was complete and not mutilated. It dealt with the matters at issue and did not attempt, at any time, to conceal the point of view of dissenting comrades.

Therefore, it is with full knowledge of the facts that communists make a decision when they are [illegible]. It is also with full knowledge of the facts, and in full possession of all relevant information, that they have decided to turn to pursuing the action, the struggle, the implementation of the 23rd Congress.

Release of Information Demanded

Paris LE MONDE in French 3-4 Dec 79 p 4

[Article by Yvonne Gallois, member of the PCF, former editor at FRANCE NOUVELLE, "PCF Paris Federation Affair: The Right to Information"]

[Text] I read in L'HUMANITE of 23 November that an important meeting of the political bureau and the Paris federation secretariat had taken place on 21 January, i.e. 10 months earlier. Contrary to what the Paris federation leaders think, and hope, Fiszbin at the first train meeting is said never to have had the character of a repudiation. That is strange. If it is so, why wait so long to talk about it? And why did all secretaries, and a few federation leaders, resign after the meeting? The party leadership states that they had no reason for doing so.[1] Then, why did they? I know most of them: they are not capricious, changing, opportunistic men and women. They have faced a tough politics, battle, and I cannot imagine that they would resign now after the others without any reason.

I cannot say if their reasons were good or bad, since I do not know what those were, since I have not heard or read anywhere, neither at a meeting nor in a party publication, the least reference to this rash of resignations. I also read in the "clarifying statement from the central committee"[2] --how I hate that phrase of evil memory!--that Henri Fiszbin had "fully presented his point of view" at the previous central committee meeting. I also read that "in a letter addressed to the party's general secretary" he had informed the latter of his intention of resigning from the central committee. Very well. But where is my share of "complete information" in all that? And where that of the other communists? What was the point of view mentioned? What did the letter say?

I have no trouble imagining that when a member of the central committee--especially one who has been the secretary of the capital's communist federation and his party's candidate for the office of mayor of Paris--decides to resign, he does not do so without serious reasons. Since I joined the PCF, this is the first time I hear of someone "resigning" from the central committee. The event seems important enough for me to expect to be informed not only of the reasons of the "judgment," but also of the arguments of the defense.

This affair is unacceptable because it is incomprehensible. I challenge anybody to pronounce only of the information filtered and censured by the

---

1. The only two remaining secretaries of the former leading team, Bernard Lalande and Lucien Degaller, resigned respectively on 29 October and 23 November.

2. L'HUMANITE, 23 November.

party leaders to keep anything at all in. As they see, how can communists be expected to learn to speak?

For my part--and I think that I am far from being alone in that respect--I refuse to remain myself silent. The members of the central committee, we are told, have received a full explanation. Why not us? Am I somehow less capable than anybody else of being deprived of that "inalienable right to act" which, according to Georges Marchais, is the right to information if ever. Finally spoke of the central committee meeting to relate the facts and explain his position. If he wrote to his party's leaders to explain the reasons for his resignation, the communists should be kept informed in everybody and the PCF's best interest, no one can expect them to renounce this essential and natural right to be informed. They are 200 percent right to reclaim it. It would be 200 percent wrong not to satisfy it.

We have had enough of these ups and downs. The 22nd Congress has "rejected them forever." I would kindly advise the leaders of my party to not be obstinate. It not known as if we all together had not seen this promise. Do not persist in an untenable position which will considerably damage the communist party for many years to come. Trust the communists, and you will have gained their gratitude. Do not lose the credit which has been acquired in painful and with so much difficulty in the question of freedom in socialist countries. Do not create the impression that you are making yourself guilty of practices that you are reproaching to those who violate the rules of responsible information and true democracy.

I shall be frank. As far as I am concerned, the question now is not to say that how is wrong, that how is right. It is to have in hand all the information concerning the "Paris federation affair," in order to evaluate a situation which concerns me as well as all communists. The central committee themselves have acknowledged that Henri Fiszbin sent a letter to explain his resignation. That letter exists. If you do not publish it, it will be said that you are concealing it out of fear. There is no way out of it. One day, you will have to show it to the communists. The sooner, the more democratic.

Further Resignation Details Sought

Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Dec 76 p 6

[Article: "Controversy within PCF Paris Federation/Mr Kalfon: 'All information has been made available to the communists'"]

[Text] In L'HUMANITE of Tuesday 7 December, Mr Henri Malberg--first secretary of the PCF Paris federation--spoke the resignation of Mr Henri Fiszbin who occupied this post until last January--answers the article by Mr Yvonne Quilio, former editor at FRANCE NOUVELLE (in MONDE, 3rd December) who asked that efte the "statement" pronounced against Mr Fiszbin. The argument is

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

REPERCUSSIONS OF SOVIET [illegible]

Paris LE [illegible] in French 17 Jan 89 p 4

[Article by Yvonne [illegible]: "Not Even Yet Dead"]

[Text] The French [illegible] party, PCF, succeeds in really engaging in organizing any activities. The party apparatus and intellectuals in support of the position on the German reunification is unanimous. According to economist J. [illegible], the events in the GDR prefigure, more or less in the same way, but more than 100 years, Marx's prediction. "Even as [illegible] several peoples who had adopted the initials appear 'far ahead in military science,' among them were Jacques Chaumeton, Jean Kanapa, and Claude Cheysson. Of the 44 members of the political committee, but the weekly REVOLUTION which the PCF is preparing to publish has not materialized, only some 15 agreed to sign the statement's terms. This confirms the existence of a split between the lines of command within the PCF. Not joining them the positions marked by the 129 engineers. The other side is still likely to be influenced by older followers of defenses of the party and the Soviet union. The statement by Henri Alleg and [illegible] which was opposed to the statement of 129 signers, may be considered representative of this latter [illegible] which does not imply agreement with the PCF's [illegible] attitude toward the 19 [illegible] Party is preparing the coming elections. In the following article the Yvonne Quilès [illegible] of Rouge NOUVELLE, expresses a critical view of the PCF leadership's positions on the [illegible] crisis.

Last Friday, I was seated in front of my television set. I was not expecting a miracle. That same morning, I had read the joint PCF-CPSU communique published in L'HUMANITE. I was very firmly convinced that the policy of the XXI Congress, the law, and the PCF's principles had been thrown overboard in Moscow.

Georges Marchais' statements on TF1 [TV channel] only made things worse. Never before had I felt so mistreated--in both substance and form--by a performance by my party's secretary general.

In addition to his method which has now become standard material for "communist" [satirical cabaret singers]: "If you interrupt me again, I am going to leave and take a walk on the streets of Moscow," the vehemence of Marchais' remarks, his use of insults that have rarely been employed since Marty's ("It's definitely up to you, Lent, to pay attention to this chimerical distinction"), and his self-servingly detailed "explanation" of the joint PCF-CPSU statement, all actually constituted a veritable plea in defense of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

I am not ashamed of being a communist. I even get some satisfaction from it insofar as we have often come very close to and occasionally even experienced a type of communism with a human face. Last Friday, we were far from such communism. I was terribly upset by a performance that was a parody of serious discussion, substituted insult for argument, "explained" the inexplicable, and which, all things considered, was conducive to further "hysterical anticommunist outbursts."

So, the French delegation had no right to do what it did in Moscow. It had no right to commit us to a course of action which is not the one we decided upon together. And Georges Marchais had no right to exacerbate this mistake by putting us many communists in an embarrassing situation.

In the PCF-CPSU communique as well as in the televised remarks of the PCF's secretary general, there is certainly no lack of incantatory proclamations significantly illustrative of the doubletalk the leadership is obliged to use because of the attachment communists have to a policy like theirs do not intend to change. Profuse references are made to the principle of noninterference. Yet this did not prevent the two delegations from signing a statement in which the word "Afghanistan" is not even mentioned even though that country is the actual scene of an undeniable violation of that principle.

I know that the U.S. and French governments, to mention but these two, are in a poor position to rebuke anyone on this particular score. Moreover, their indignation has little effect because their own hands are far from clean. The United States wants to secure its empire up to the very borders of the socialist camp. That is obvious. But must one high-handedness be fought with another high-handedness, one invasion be preferred to another? The Soviets intervene militarily to expand the socialist camp's sphere of

influence on the American will intervene militarily to prevent this expansion. Is this a solution? What are possible results from such confrontation through third-party actions? What attention is being paid to democracy, public opinion, and people's freedom of choice in all of this?

Nothing, absolutely nothing justifies the PCI's approval of the Soviet military intervention. Not the principle of noninterference admits of an exception, a fortiori when the intervention is meant merely to deter. [illegible] Marchais dwelt at length on the friendship treaty between Afghanistan and the USSR. Really, how can anyone possibly take that point without becoming utterly ridiculous? Are we to seriously believe that the Amin government "appealed" for help from the USSR and the very first manifestation of that help was Amin's immediate assassination?

The whole thing would be a farce were it not so serious. Today's L'UNITÀ gives considerable coverage to massive [illegible] taken by the new Afghan government in free political elections. But these already occurred when the Soviets, by their own admission, were already in the country. [illegible] were waited until the Soviet intervention before becoming indignant at Amin's bloody administration? But Amin, like others, suddenly went into the "bad fascist" camp alongside Pol Pot, as the result of a sudden Soviet turnaround? We do not say that these torturers, these fascists, should be excused, but why wait for the green light from Moscow or Hanoi to denounce them? I would be much more sympathetic to L'UNITÀ's belated discovery if, precisely, they were not belated and if they displayed a spirit of independence that cannot be acquired merely by proclaiming it.

Admittedly there are some prejudicial expressions of indignation, but must we keep silent because others are talking? Must we approve because there are condemning voices which should prevail, the test of unity in action company, or respect for democratic and our declared principles? Were we in such good company in 1968 when we disapproved of the entry of Soviet tanks into Prague?

Because, in fact, there is no doubt, must we, therefore, tolerate having socialists that accommodate themselves to brute autocracy, or in many cases, to no democracy at all?

I do not accept the opinion of a communique that turns its back on what gave some balance to Georges Marchais' statement on TF1, namely the positive overall nature of the socialist countries. I do not accept the reservation of only one aspect while dismissing the other with a simple one of the "bigger." I do not contest with Georges Marchais' own statement about the existence of differing opinions. Galileo in Czechoslovakia, he once said "In my discussions with the Soviets, I made no secret of the fact that their action had nothing in it with socialism." Why isn't there some trace of this verbal indignation in the present joint communique? I am not pleased to learn that these differing opinions were "thoroughly" discussed, only to find merely an innocuous statement to that effect in the communique. Georges Marchais' remarks on TF1 are worse, but the communique is a document, a disturbing document.

We are told--the PCF's secretary general repeated it on Friday--that Kabul and Prague are not the same. In actual fact, what is not the same is the PCF's attitude. In Prague, it had refused to believe the Soviets, whereas in Kabul, it believed them, that's all!

Communists in the thousands have become seriously perturbed. And with very good reason. Are the Italian, Spanish, and Yugoslav communists, the Peace Movement in France, etc., instruments of Carter and international socio-democracy? Are they allied? Are they "hysterical anticommunists"? If they are, then they must be clearly told so and cast adrift. If they are not, then can there possibly be two truths where the principle of noninterference is concerned? In the name of this principle, can one communist party condemn intervention while another justifies it?

The PCF has submitted an emergency resolution to the European Parliament, a resolution denouncing Moscow's action. What will the French communist members of that parliament do? Will they contend that this is a superficial disagreement, that each one is free to make his own decisions, that Eurocommunism is still in fine shape and does not frighten us?

This is an untenable position. In the joint communique, it is the same with Eurocommunism as with the rest -- de facto abandonment. And Georges Marchais' vehement statements to the contrary do not alter this fact in any way. This fundamental difference of views on the Soviet intervention between the Italian and Spanish parties on the one side and the French party on the other, follows other previous differences over such important strategic issues as the analysis of the international crisis, Europe, the entry of Greece and Spain into the Common Market, etc.

What is now left of this Eurocommunism? Eurocommunism is a certain conception of socialism. It enables several communist parties to advance in a united way, based on convergent analyses, toward a form of socialism which has numerous common characteristics in addition to its national peculiarities. These convergences are becoming less and less evident, and the PCF-CPSU communique has only succeeded in reducing them even more.

Those who once believed Georges Marchais was Eurocommunism's representative in Moscow were mistaken. Also

(Leadership, Name, Title Changes)

Paris LE MATIN in French 19 Jan 80 p 9

[Commentary by Roger Fajes, independent deputy from Aveyron and former chairman of the MRG [Radical Movement of the Left]: "Bowing to the Obvious"]

[Text] The last few illusions are fading. The communist party will not change. Diverse men of the left, socialists and radicals in particular, had

The "nibbling" at a fissured and heterogeneous Western bloc will first be done through distant countries on the slopes of the domain granted the USSR by the Yalta agreements.

The Soviet Union certainly does not want war. More than 20 million of its people lost their lives in war. But the survival of its system, whose economic success has been questionable, is dependent upon territorial expansion with, as a corollary, the acquisition of the resources it still lacks.

"American imperialism," currently on the verge of decline, is being opposed more and more effectively by "Soviet imperialism."

The political pundits of the French Communist Party--at the risk of alienating some of the rank and file--are counting on the ultimate victory of Soviet imperialism. The day the threat would draw nearer to France, the Communist team would be fully ready to assume power. It would not have to be brought into our territory in sealed freight cars or transport aircraft.

The evasiveness of the United States, the snubbing of the United Nations secretary general, and the timorous attitude of French diplomacy have strengthened their analysis of the situation.

The Western nations are on the brink of another Munich.

If Soviet expansionism is not countered, if anarchy and divisions continue to reign in the Middle East, then there will be other Afghanistans. And one of them could perhaps be much nearer to us, possibly Yugoslavia.

The time has come for Frenchmen, temperamentally too indifferent, to take cognizance of this danger.

The President of the Republic sounded the alarm in extending his New Year wishes. He cannot be blamed for having treated his fellow countrymen as adults after having too long painted a rosy future.

In the face of these well-founded misgivings, the time has undoubtedly come for a collective effort enabling our country to overcome its domestic crises so as to be able to play a useful role on the international scene.

We must not, however, seek a false unanimity within an illusory national union. Instead we must first raise the always necessary discussion of ideas to a level other than the one of personal attacks, reelection campaigns, and struggling between cliques.

Then the governmental majority must become convinced of the need for a real social policy designed to reduce cases of injustice and have people more equitably share in sacrifices.

The democratic opposition must abandon all illusions, leave the communist leadership in the isolation in which it is confining itself, and move realistically towards regrouping all forces of progress, the real left.

All of this should be done as part of the certainly difficult dialog I personally have endeavored to initiate, a dialog whose success will serve the cause of democracy and hence the cause of our threatened peace in this period of tension.

PCF, CGT Relationship Strained

Paris *LE MONDE* in French 19 Jan 80 pp 1, 7

[Article by Jeannine Bou: "Uneasiness Mounts in CGT Ranks"]

[Text] The Afghanistan crisis continues to create a stir in France. By refraining from any criticism of the Soviet intervention, the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] leadership has appreciably intensified the uneasiness of many of its members already offended by the pressure exerted on the Confederation by the PCF these past few months.

When interviewed on Antenne 2 [TV channel] on 17 January, Georges Seguy explained: "Afghanistan is not our main concern. We do not want to waste too much time on an issue that took up only 20 percent of the deliberations at the most recent meeting of the CGT's executive committee." Of course, if the borders of a distant country had been crossed by American or Chinese armored units, the event would have caused an stir within the CGT. The CGT would have unanimously condemned it as a violation of the ban on the use of armed force and of the principle of noninterference in a country's internal affairs.

But the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has radically altered the basic facts surrounding the problem. Coming after Budapest and Prague, it has deeply shocked a working class attached to the right of self-determination of nations. It has also cast the worst light of probability on the ties between Moscow and the PCF and on the CGT's relations with the PCF.

The 44th CGT Congress in Grenoble had seemingly instilled a democratic spirit in that old labor organization, a spirit capable of coming up the close ties resulting from the similarity of objectives and doctrines, ties reinforced by the dual CGT and PCF membership of a large majority of the confederation's leaders.

This desire for change was a sincere aspiration among many CGT members. Among others, it represented a willingness to correct the situation created by the left's defeat in the 1978 legislative elections, and also correspond the decline in the CGT's following in many firms.

[illegible] the [illegible] militants [illegible] the [illegible] of its traditionalist elements. It was opposed [illegible] by the strategists at Place du Colonel Fabien (PCF headquarters), as later brought to light during the 22e PCF Congress. Intensifying PCF hostile tendencies [illegible] the [illegible] "commando" struggle with the latter [illegible] traditional "territory" in the steel industry crisis in Lorraine. The PCF even compared [illegible] a "giant labor federation." In determining what demands the workers should make, heavily [illegible] credit for any successes and blame all failures on reformist labor unions. In this deliberate [illegible] of [illegible] methods, the CGT was mobilized to support the PCF campaign against enlargement of the European Community, and at the same time the "guerrilla warfare" against the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] was intensified with "logistical support" being furnished by the [illegible] of [illegible]SANITY.

At the [illegible] meeting of its national council, the PCF spoke even more plainly about the plans for the CGT. While speaking in Marseilles one [illegible] merely served all things considered, to shed even more glaring light on their views as to the CGT's ties with the PCF, Krasucki enlightened the [illegible] of the CGT's rank and file.

Yet we must not underestimate the clout and merit of the large labor confederation's secretary general. Although he did call the PCF's expression of the defense of workers rights, in the case [illegible], to endanger or "gain accompaniment" of the 40th CGT Congress point like "against reactions of crippling narrow-mindedness and traditionalism," Krasucki called upon the senior militants in important plants to participate actively in implementing the decisions of that congress and also took action to strengthen the CGT's position in the labor-management conciliation boards elections. For centre as it were, there followed an appeal to Christian militants and a defense of the unitary agreement with the [illegible], an agreement that had been quickly denounced as a shift to the right resulting from the CGT's "reorientation."

Then Krasucki [illegible], since last fall, had been avoiding the PCF at similar [illegible] of labor union activity, found support in the ranks of the CGT. Pierre Gensane and Pierre Pouilly, members of the CGT's executive committee and also [illegible] militants, likewise denounced the PCF which they claimed was "destroying the CGT and tearing to shreds the agreement reached between the two large labor confederations in September 1978."

The cooperation of many CGT members was further heightened when the PCF wanted to involve the CGT in demonstrations it was organizing to protest against "turbulences." Such participation had been approved in principle by CGT headquarters on the national level, but several members of the executive bureau denounced the PCF's attempt and [illegible]'s deliberate omission of parts of the statement published by the CGT on the "turbulences" issue. The "ready to dump" phrase is the last straw and has led to eye-opening at last.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible]

[illegible] SIGNIFICANCE OF [illegible] VISIT

[illegible] HUMANITE DIMANCHE in French 16-22 Jan 84 pp 22-23

[Interview with [illegible] by Francette Lazard in Jorge Amado's home in Salvador de Bahia: "Brazil and Socialism: Rapid and Decisive Advance"; date and place not given]

[Text] A delegation of the French Communist Party led by Georges Marchais visited Moscow from 7 to 11 January. It had talks with a delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, including Leonid Brezhnev. Political observer Francette Lazard, who took part in the discussions, comments on some of the true significance and scope of the Moscow talks. In the face of the extraordinary manipulation of [illegible] facts known about or frozen with regard to the relations between the PCF and the CPSU, Francette Lazard's remarks will enable the readers of [illegible] HUMANITE DIMANCHE to put things back in their proper place.

[illegible] on this delegation, and

[Answer] The talks that have just taken place and that ended with a joint communique published simultaneously and in its entirety in [illegible] HUMANITE and [illegible] were prepared for for several months by meetings at various [illegible] and [illegible] delegations. Therefore there is nothing extraordinary about them. They were within the framework of implementation of the decisions of the [illegible] Congress on development of a broad international policy [illegible] party. In accordance with our orientations which constitute [illegible] objectives of struggle for [illegible] of nations and [illegible] against [illegible] disarmament and emancipation of the peoples, a new international order, a democratic Europe

[illegible] have great objective value for a strengthening of [illegible] against militarism, a broadening of it to all the forces of progress struggling in the world. And it is in this perspective that [illegible] months [illegible] talks at the highest level in Yugoslavia, Algeria, Poland, [illegible] with T. Berlinguer, and finally, in Moscow last week, with a CPSU delegation led by L. Brezhnev.

[illegible] All the commentators are talking, in this regard, about the U.S.'s disagreement with Moscow.

[illegible] What I proposed to Haig, I made note of the commentaries by the leaders of the right-wing opposition, the socialist Party, all the internal opposition. As for disagreement--that is correct. The participants in the negotiations, as they go ahead, in the realm of substance, do continue, as before and only even more so, to preserve their freedom of judgment without knowledge of the text of the joint communique as well as of the [illegible] statements on TV [illegible] television]--and do not know what their opinions are, either. That is the only way to overcome the [illegible] existing--not allowed by the current violent campaign. In this respect, it is more than ever necessary to read [illegible] every day.

[illegible] In concrete terms, then, what were the subjects in Moscow and what were the main conclusions from these talks?

[Answer] The two delegations first had an exchange of information on the situation in their respective countries. Then we discussed the evolution of the international situation in all its aspects, our common objectives, and on the specific ways [illegible] we discussed the problems of cooperation between our nations, which involved a very far-reaching discussion of questions of interest on the basis of socialist democracy, the diversity of the ways [illegible] toward socialism. We have in this regard developed the conclusions of our 25th Congress. We have reaffirmed our conception of international life [illegible]. These questions, evoked by [illegible] in TV interviews, have been [illegible] judged by the commentators, who thus purely and simply ignore everything that contradicts their campaign on the PCF's alignment.

[Question] The attacks are centered on the problem of Afghanistan. But the general discussion does not rise to this question directly.

[Answer] Indeed, it does not rise then or, neither does it rise on the usually main question of Iran or others. As I said, it is not an obsession [illegible], but the announcement of major axes of positions that are common to us on the international field.

But these broad data, the evolutions and evolutions in progress, are precisely what must be taken as starting points for evaluating particular situations. This is why, before going into the subject of Afghanistan, I would like to express the guiding principles of this discussion.

First of all, the general direction of the world's evolution.

We have spoken together that the principal issue of the present world situation is indeed the modification of the relationship of forces in favor of peace, independence and socialism. That is fundamental.

PCF'S FITERMAN REJECTS 'ANTICOMMUNIST OUTCRY' OVER RIGHTS DOCUMENT

[illegible] Paris L'HUMANITE in French 23 Feb 80 p 4 LD

[Unattributed report: "We Will Wage the Human Rights Battle to the End"]

[Text] PCF central committee secretary Charles Fiterman was in Le Havre yesterday evening. On this occasion he stated in particular:

The major initiative just taken by our party in setting up a committee for the defense of freedom and human rights and publishing a document giving a preliminary account of human rights violations in the world in the past 30 years has sparked a positive storm of protest from the major sections of the media.

Why this fuss and outburst?

First, because this initiative places the fight for human rights on its real territory and gives this fight its full meaning, dimension and scope. Yes, we are saying loud and clear: Human rights mean the right to eat your fill, to live a decent life, to work, to health care, to housing, to education and culture, to sport and to leisure; it is the right to provide a secure future for your children; the right to "live in the country," the right to express your opinion, to uphold it and to make decisions. It is the right to justice, freedom and dignity and the right to happiness.

The second reason for their outcry is that our initiative clearly highlights the efforts mounted by imperialism and its supporters to ignore that human rights are merely a pseudopolitical pretext and a stock argument against socialism.

The cheats have been caught in a trap. They are afraid to [see] their cheap finery being torn away. They are afraid of the real situation in socialist countries being objectively understood.

That is what is worrying them. That is why they are keeping quiet about Georges Marchais' statements at his press conference, and suppressing the document we have just published.

At the same time as they are covering up in this way they are talking about other things. They are discussing our alleged desire to adopt an isolated position or return to the cold war, some "cult" around Georges Marchais or some other nonsense they have dreamed up.

However, they should not entertain any illusions. First, because all the indications are that our initiative is already enjoying wide support. Second, because we are determined to wage the battle for human rights--and for truth--to the end. For instance, I would like to tell you that we have just decided to print 3 million copies of Georges Marchais' press conference.

The attempt to stifle us will be defeated!

As you see, the present external and internal tensions and the anti-communist outburst reflect an escalation in the class struggle in the present period and the importance of what is at stake in this struggle. We are witnessing the decline of capital's system of domination, the rise of socialism and, more generally, of the forces of progress and freedom. We are living in the age of revolutions. The oppressors and capitalist plunderers are being pushed back. They are being attacked. The system is grinding to a halt and breaking up. That is why they are hanging on, crying out and even launching counteroffensives in some places. They are concentrating their attacks on their main enemy which, in France, is the PCF.

They are making all the more fuss because they are not succeeding in attaining their objectives. The smokescreen covers irrefutable facts. The workers refuse to submit to the austerity policy, despite pressures and interference. There are the by-elections whose results are concealed or distorted by commentators such as the election in Issy-les-Moulineaux where the PCF gained 4.5 percent in Gennevilliers where it gained 3 percent in Bruay where it won 3 percent more votes and in Saint-Joachim where it won 5.5 percent more votes. Since 1 January our party has recorded 15,000 new members. With the new HUMANITE-DIMANCHE there has been a leap forward in weekly distribution which has reached nearly 60,000 additional copies. There is still the warmth and strength of relations between the communists and the workers--millions of French men and women. There is fraternity among the communists themselves, who have never been so united and determined as they now are.

Better and better understood

Far from being isolated, we feel that we are better and better understood, and it is that which is sparking off the sour reaction from those who would like a docile working class, a servile youth and subservient workers.

Too, everything indicates that the anticommunist outcry is sparking off growing distrust.

It is too crude to be true. The workers know from experience that the PCI is not this crude caricature.

They also say: If those who oppose us are attacking this party so savagely, it means that we have the same adversaries.

Let us come to grips with this adversary.

The lies can and will backfire on their authors.

This is not 1939 or 1956. The world has changed and we have changed too. Of course, the struggle is difficult. However, the social struggle is like life: if progress is to be made, you have to go through periods of tension and confrontation. Today we do not simply want to resist and stand firm. We want to make progress with the workers. We must, and it is possible.

I would like to draw the attention of you all, especially of the communists, to the fact that this progress now requires the deployment of resolutely offensive activity, political and ideological initiative and the organisation of the workers' action. We must explain and act quickly, justly and strongly. Many communists are already doing this. All of us, all those who share our hopes, must join this effort. This is the key to solving both the problems which affect the present situation and those which relate to the people's movement's future.

This is the conclusion which we draw from the present situation, friends and comrades.

CSO 3100

[illegible] SECTION [illegible]

"[illegible] [illegible] MEDIA [illegible] OF HUMAN RIGHTS [illegible]

[illegible] Paris L'HUMANITE in French 25 Dec 80 p 1 [illegible]

[Article by Jan Barnier: "Try it, Gentlemen!"]

[Text] In the LE FIGARO edition which gives an account of George Marchais' press conference on the defense of freedom and human rights, Andre Laurens writes: "The PCF secretary general's tone and the general tendency of the PCF leadership toward the media and public opinion are more significant than the substance of their party's proposals."

The press, radio and television in their entirety can cast an argument--which permits any interpretation--point and simply to avoid the heart of our demarche, our call to defend freedom throughout the world, beginning in France, and give themselves over to the most fantastic speculation of George Marchais' "tone." This crude examination is the height of caricature of our policy in defiance of the truth they claim that we have abandoned our strategy of union, that we provoked anti-communism by our will for isolation and that we are allied with Reagan. In the event some people are going through a second childhood, going so far as to suggest that the communists are foreign agents, and calling our party fascist and its leaders bad, they can see that those who pretend to be shocked by the "tone" of our words do not recoil from the ignoble.

In this anticommunist frenzy, one thing recurs strongly. We are apparently giving a distorted image of the press generally, we are putting forward a "climate of intolerance" which threatens the "freedom to inform and be informed." This is what certain journalists have recently stated in a communique calling for the creation of a defense committee, journalists who are quite timid elsewhere when it is a question of denouncing the Giscardian domination of the media and are struck dumb when the socialist party calls journalists of the radio-television service "auxiliary policemen."

The originators of this appeal assert, however, that "the freedom of speech, of pluralist, contradictory expression, remains one of democracy's foundations," and that they intend "really following their profession." I am tempted to say: Try it, gentlemen! Suppose we spoke a little of the facts.

At the press conference which served as a pretext for the present anti-communist campaign, Georges Marchais publicized a preliminary account of the 20 years of attacks on world human rights. This is a carefully elaborated indictment or irrefutable, terrible indictment of imperialism. All the organs of L'HUMANITE, the press, radio and television bid it from the platforms of France. When is this document going to be published and brought to the attention of the listeners and viewers? Since the new year, hours of radio and pages of press have been devoted to the action--of which we disapprove--against Afghanistan terrorism. But you have to listen out and read carefully to discover that, in the same period, imperialism has killed 30 demonstrators in El Salvador, devastated by insurgents by the score on a public square in Saudi Arabia and shot 51 people in Guatemala, where crimes and massacres have left nearly 40,000 dead since 1966. Consequently, how can one fail to interpret the daily apocalyptic accounts of the socialist countries, written in the name of human rights and with contempt for reality, as a way of hiding and washing of imperialism's crimes?

Let us take another example. Georges Marchais is the only national politician to have published his entire income in the weekly paper LE POINT's inquiry. The president of the republic shied away, Mr Barre imposed silence on his ministers, Gaston Defferre did not deign to reveal his fortune. Compelled by our intervention to narrow its initiative, LE POINT has not, however, published the whole of the 11 replies which it received. When is it going to do so? When are the great information media going to emerge from their silence and tell the truth about the relationship between money and politics? In any event, their obstruction is significant of the fact that the freedom to inform, loudly asserted by some people, ever when the right becomes tied up with business.

The capitalists who have recently started a campaign against us, reminiscent of many, many times, definitely have a great deal to do to "really follow their profession."

In truth, the recent anti-communist uproar shows that we have struck home. For many years, in fact, imperialism has been trying to impose a kind of monopoly on human rights which, by an extraordinary reversal of roles, depicts the socialist countries as an immense totalitarian universe, the people's liberation movement as the expression of fanaticism and the capitalist countries as the last lands of freedom. Thus, the forces of the past seek to stem the people's surge, to cast doubt on socialism, despairing of any prospects for change and, in France, to weaken the PCF which, as bearer of the people's hopes, opposes their policy.

To denounce this ploy, to avoid the challenge to the people's clearsightedness and to clarify the reality of the socialist countries and likewise of imperialism's balance-sheet of oppression is to attack a linch-pin of the ideological counter-offensive by the supporters of the capitalist system, which trample underfoot the economic, social, political and cultural rights of billions of men and women throughout the world. Thus the anger and annoyance with which they have greeted our initiative. They would like to drown our voice because they fear confrontation on this decisive field of democracy, which is another reason for insisting upon the truth on giving full scope to our human rights campaign.

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

BRIEFS

[illegible] PROPAGANDA CAPABILITY--The PCY is going to improve its propaganda capability prior to the 1982 presidential election. The first step will be to connect the [PCY] headquarters at the Place de Colonel Fabien to [illegible] with all outlying federations [illegible] their headquarters. [Text] [Paris: LE POINT in French 19 Feb 82 p 35]

[illegible] TELEGRAM TO TITO--Belgrade, 1 Mar (TANJUG)--French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing sent a telegram to President Tito today when flying over Yugoslavia. In the telegram, President Giscard d'Estaing again sets out his great admiration for President Tito in his lifetime and extends most sincere wishes to President Tito, personally, and the people of Yugoslavia. [Text] [LD011831 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1631 GMT 1 Mar 82 LD]

[illegible] [illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted] ON YUGOSLAV DEVELOPMENTS

Stability Is Important

[redacted] in Greek 24 Jan 80 p 37

[Article by former Premier Pan. Kanellopoulos "A Reversal Is in No One's Interest"]

[Text] After Tito--regardless of what direct or indirect, abrupt or more delayed effects will be caused by his absence--the world will have lost the last of the great protagonists in the second world war. There were seven of those whose departures from life and history have followed in turn: Mussolini, Hitler, Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, De Gaulle and Tito. No one else, neither a general nor a political leader, fell on the world's history with the force which these men cast on it. The last four also placed their seal on a period, smaller or greater, of post-war life.

The Tito phenomenon is the most amazing. Not only because he has stood upright on the international scene for 35 years since the end of world war II, but also because he has been the only case of a leader of a relatively small country whose action has had an international effect; moreover, since 1966, he has opened a bypass on the road of world history, especially for people's democracies.

Will this bypass be maintained in Europe, especially the Balkans, after Tito's departure?

There is, certainly, risk. I do not think, however, that we can consider the case of this huge country the same as the case of Yugoslavia, even though the two phenomena are similar. Tito extracted Yugoslavia from a specific "world" of peoples who have the same sociopolitical system, without coming into opposition with this "world" and its leading power, the Soviet Union. He took important initiatives in the area of the "non-

alone" which [illegible] probably will remain in the future—a [illegible] more or less enforced and with deep domestic divisions. Also, the relations of Tito's Yugoslavia with the so-called western "world" are very different from those of China. They have been developed in a very amicable atmosphere, not without the smallest jabs at another great country, the Soviet Union. Tito also collaborated with great willingness in the accord and cooperation of the Balkan countries, including Greece, with which it had already, in the fifties, contracted special agreements with Bulgaria, Rumania and Turkey. On all levels of international life, Tito's action and initiative have been pacifying, accomodating and constructive.

I think that there is no justification for any upsetting whatsoever of the benefit to all, large or small, of the stability caused or strengthened by Tito's policy in the Balkans.

Nevertheless, many fears are being expressed. The fact alone that they are being expressed creates a bad atmosphere. The worse thing is that certain great western countries have hurried to officially adopt these fears and proclaim that they are directly interested in the maintenance of Yugoslavia's independence. Such proclamations are a great tactical mistake. They are provocative without being realistic. Indeed, I have the impression, even if I do not have related information, that they have not been asked for. [Editor's note: This article was given to EPIKAIRA by Pan. Lucellopoulos on 17 January 1980, before Yugoslavia's reactions to foreign countries' proclamations on Yugoslavia's independence were made known.] I fear these great words which are hard to follow, if the history [illegible] it, with great deeds.

I cannot make specific predictions. The general situation in the world, especially in the Middle East, Iran and Afghanistan, is so irregular and has reached such a dramatic tension that it is impossible for me to examine the possibility of developments in other areas—for example, in the Balkans—without knowing what extensions the events in Iran or Afghanistan could have in the near future, even tomorrow morning. The irrational is a logically inconceivable vacuum within which everything can be seen. Thus, I prefer to confine myself to what I have already said.

Since our subject is Tito, let me be allowed to recollect several moments related to my personal life. I had the great honour of meeting Tito when he officially visited Greece for the first time in 19[illegible]. I was then minister of national defense in the Papago government. I met him later in Salonica

while representing the Greek Government when he spent several hours there. In September 1960, I had been invited, as vice-president in the Karamanlis government, to Yugoslavia by then Vice-President Tontorovic [transliterated from Greek], an old comrade-in-arms of Tito in the Yugoslavian mountains during World War II, for negotiations of a political and economic nature. At that time, I remained one week in Yugoslavia. Field Marshal Tito was kind enough to invite me to visit him on a little island near the island of Brioni [transliterated from Greek], where he was taking his summer vacation. I spent a whole day there with him. Accompanying me was former Minister of Commerce Leonidas Bertilis and the former Greek ambassador to Belgrade, General Theofyvoulos Tsakalotos, my old friend and fearless companion in great or tragic hours. After we had traversed, on foot or by small carriage (an old type with horses), several sightworthy parts of the enchanting small island, Tito led us, before lunch, to his underground "little library," as he called it. It was his "cellar" with plenty of shelves and bottles of wine. When we went in, he took down, as if randomly, one of the many bottles. When he showed it to me, I saw that it was a wine dated 1902. Amazed, I told him that that was the year of my birth. He smiled and took down—as if randomly, again—a bottle from another shelf which contained wine dated 1892. He told me then, smiling: "In that year I was born." It was clear that these "coincidences" had been preplanned. It was a very courteous thought which particularly moved me. I will always remember the scene and, above all, the great personality of Tito, the simple and sincere man who gave me the opportunity to also get to know his very humane side.

Threat From North

Athens KYRIAKOS in Greek 24 Jan 84 p 4

[Article by EDIK [Democratic Center Union] President Ioannis Zigdis "The Great Opportunity"]

[Text] Two months ago, the government, through the minister of national defense, assured the nation, in the most explicit way, that the "danger from the north" was non-existent. Acting in compliance with this viewpoint recently, the government hastened to grant the famous port facilities in Syros to the Soviet Union.

So were then in a period when it was in mode for a scenario of adopting an allegedly multidimensional foreign policy to be promoted to replace the one-dimensional policy followed until that time by the government.

Today, with the justification being Tito's illness, the same government seems to be possessed by intense feelings of uneasiness about the "danger from the north" during the period after Tito; it is obviously trying to prepare public opinion for a hasty and narrow-minded return into the NATO military branch.

This arresting inconsistency in the government's policy cannot be justified, however, by Tito's illness because the question of what could happen in Yugoslavia when the field marshal is gone has been asked and discussed internationally for many years.

We denounce the government for the Gyros dockyard agreement since we believe absolutely that it was putting on an act when, during the premier's trip to Moscow, it claimed that it had definitely oriented itself to a multidimensional foreign policy when, at the same time, it hastened to return to NATO.

Events justified us because it is now clear that the agreement was made with little scruple in order to deceive public opinion, particularly the left, and also to secure the undisturbed presence of the American bases since port facilities were also granted to the Soviet Union.

This policy, however, which is particularly reminiscent of the famous Bertoldian' craftiness, was unable to remain without consequences which are beginning to become comprehensible to even the most ignorant.

But let us look at what the "danger from the north" consists of for our country when Tito's strong personality does not exist in Yugoslavia.

This clearly concerns a case where Yugoslavia will be placed, in the A or B manner, under the Soviet Union's controls because then the Warsaw Pact forces will not have seven boundaries with us, only Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. If, however, Yugoslavia is placed under Soviet control, then surely the strategic status quo will be upset in the Mediterranean because the Soviets will have free access to the Adriatic and will not be impeded by the Dardanelles and the Greek islands. Thus, the strategic importance of these two countries will be decreased decisively.

For this reason, in the event of such a Soviet expansion, the Soviet Union will not need, at least in the first phase, to act against our country. It will be useless to the Soviets.

The danger, therefore, does not concern our country; it concerns directly and catalytically the NATO alliance which will be forced to share the Mediterranean with the Soviets.

But it is clear that, under these conditions, Greece's strategic position, instead of being weakened, would be increased many times for NATO. Because Greece is the only strategic country which can be used to impede the eventual Soviet infiltration into Yugoslavia. A simple glance at the map is sufficient to see all of this.

Thus, it is clear that NATO has need of Greece, not Greece of NATO.

Our country, therefore, is in an advantageous position and can demand from NATO that it heal the wounds it has caused Greece. Indeed, the government can demand from NATO "ironclad guarantees" about our territorial integrity on land, air and sea and also the immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces from Cyprus. Therefore, as long as the government insists upon returning to the military branch of NATO, the "danger from the north" makes Greece's position very strong for safeguarding its vital interests and satisfying demands related to these.

Nevertheless, it cannot be an excuse for our hurried return without terms to the NATO military branch. Thus, the government is given an opportunity to follow a courageous stance and exploit NATO's weakness.

If, on the other hand, mistakenly estimating or acting under other expediencies, it hastens to reenter without safeguarding our national independence and territorial integrity, and the liberation of Cyprus, then it will be completely unpardonable. It will be a government of national concession to the lowest bidder.

Balkan Cooperation Is Imperative

Athens [illegible] in Greek 24 Apr 80 p 6

[Interview with KOSLIN [Democratic Socialist Party] President Giorgos Papaconstou]

[Text] Question: How do you view Tito? What effects will his death have for the world in general and the Balkans in particular?

Answer: Without Tito, the balance of forces in the world, especially in the Balkans, will become more delicate. If Tito

is definitely gone, surely the world will be poorer with the absence of the last of a pleiad of great men who played a leading role in the outcome of the Second World War and the historic changes which it brought in the international political map. Also irreplaceable will be the loss of the last of the originators of the movement of nonaligned countries and especially a leader of a country which follows its own road to socialism and holds a very delicate position in the system of equality of forces in Europe, particularly in the Balkans.

Question: Do you think that Yugoslavia after Tito will have the same fate as Afghanistan or Czechoslovakia? Or perhaps there are special terms compelling the Soviet Union to not touch this country; in other words, after Tito, its relations with Yugoslavia will be maintained as they are while Tito is alive?

Answer: It would not be correct to identify Yugoslavia's position with that of Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan. The network of international relation surrounding Yugoslavia is very different from that of the two other countries, which means that any action whatsoever in Yugoslavia, after all the things which have preceded, would cause reactions with very serious consequences for world peace. The singularity of Yugoslavia is inherent not only in the authoritative way in which Tito's partisans created the post-war federal state of the new Yugoslavia. It is inherent also in the repulsion of the Stalinist leadership's effort in 1948 to impose its own conception for building socialism in Yugoslavia. Since then Yugoslavia, headed by Tito, has followed its own road which, domestically, is defined by the principles of a self-administrative socialist system and, internationally, by the principles of a nonaligned policy. These principles have withstood the trials of more than three decades and have created a strong tradition both domestically and internationally. Perhaps this stands as the most significant "special term" which will be a guarantee for the maintenance of Yugoslavia's relations not only in face of the Soviet Union, but also the rest of the world.

Question: In view of the possibility that after Tito the eastern countries will try to return Yugoslavia in some way to the Soviet Union's control, perhaps a readjustment of Greece's international relations is needed?

Answer: The possibility of developments toward a more delicate equilibrium, without Tito, makes the stabilizing role of Greece and its strategic significance more important. This necessarily entails adjustments in Greece's foreign and defense policies. Greece's international relations are no longer able

to be designated on the basis of its long-term national interests which are inseparably bound with the protection of peace, cooperation and exclusion in the world, particularly in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. All of the country's political forces are jointly responsible for a policy of active and dynamic peaceful cooperation in the Balkans. This policy has already borne positive fruits and can bear many more in the future. It is in the interest of Greece, but also the other Balkan countries, to support their cooperation and solution of any of their differences in a spirit of friendship and good neighborliness, without outside interference from the superpowers or other factors. Any upset whatsoever in the balance of forces in the area which would reverse this process is consequently contrary to Greece's policy.

Question: Will the reentry of Yugoslavia into the eastern (pro-Soviet) alliance have a serious effect on Greece's strategic situation, now that there is the Turkish danger against Greece?

Answer: Our country's relations of friendship and multilateral cooperation with Yugoslavia have deep roots and must be maintained in every way, as a factor of equilibrium in the Balkans. The fact that Yugoslavia is a nonaligned country did not hinder these relations, nor has the development of Greek-Turkish relations in the last decade disturbed them. If, however, changes occur in Yugoslavia's nonaligned character, then evolution to a more delicate equilibrium in the Balkans will make international infractions and arbitrary acts in our area more dangerous.

The need for respect of the international order, UN decisions and legal procedures on the part of Turkey in Cyprus and its relations with Greece becomes more imperative. This will have to be taken into serious consideration also by the two superpowers and the European countries, as well as by other factors in international life.

Afghanistan [no of interview]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

by them to the javelin thrust which is occuring on the marble threshing floors between Charon [in myth, the boatman in Hades] and field marshal Tito, this new Digenis. It appears that this will not be long in coming. Before I begin an analysis of the political consequences which his migration will cause, I feel the need to bow to the first anti-seditionist, the first guerilla against the German-Italian occupation and, at the same time, the first rebel against the Soviet claim to direct, as ruler, the fates of the countries which did not recognise, like several others, imported socialism but won, with weapon in hand, their freedom.

I am not willing to accept the beautiful but, after Afghanistan, untrustworthy assurance of the Soviet side [to the degree RIZOSPASTIS officially expressed it on 10 January] that the worries being expressed about Yugoslavia are nothing more than a simple revival of a cold war myth, while no one is threatening our neighboring country. We are unfortunately confronting a redistribution of the world by the superpowers who, either through armed invasion, pressure or the creation of fifth columns inside the countries to which they aspire, are pursuing their own expansion.

That such a threat exists, that there is such a danger, is attested by the state of vigilance, that is alert, of the Yugoslav armed forces, numbering 270,000 men, and by the cancelling of many military leaves. It is attested, moreover, by the fact that the guards at all the embassies in Belgrade, particularly those of the Soviet Union and the United States, have been increased. In Belgrade, not only is a Soviet invasion feared, but also action by pro-Soviet Yugoslavs who publish illegal printed matter and insult the nearly dead Tito, acting like a fifth column.

Regular nightly guards, groups of workers, have been placed at all the Yugoslav businesses in order to strengthen the "self-protection" needed in general popular defense, including the armed forces. The amputation of Tito's leg, even if he rejects it most intensely, is rumored to be possible. Yugoslavia's economic situation is very bad. Inflation is galloping at around 30 percent and the foreign trade deficit reaches 6.3 billion dollars in 1979.

In the meantime, hypocritically, the western imperialists Carter, Thatcher, etc., as well as China, are expressing "concerns" and sympathy for Tito. But where can this sympathy lead? Perhaps to a general or even local conflagration?

Tito himself has knowledge of the severity of the situation and maintains continual contact with Kolisevski and Doronjski who are two of his most dominant dauphins.

The international crisis in Iran and Afghanistan, which coincide with the sickness of the aged field marshal, create additional complications. Actually, Yugoslavia has intensely condemned the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan because it is itself worried that, after Tito's death, the Soviets might use the same action as before.

Indeed, within the climate created by the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan, many observers are now expressing fears about a direct or indirect invasion also into Yugoslavia in case of anomalies in the post-Tito period; it is added, moreover, that such anomalies—for example, national antagonisms amongst the various nationalities in the Yugoslav federation—could be used by Moscow to justify a direct invasion.

The reactions of Bulgaria in particular are being followed; it is considered the most trustworthy ally of the Soviet Union in the area and it has differences with Yugoslavia on Macedonia.

The principal western countries are reminding Moscow that any action whatsoever against Yugoslavia will cause tremendous reactions. Because, as is known, Yugoslavia has secured certain western guarantees so that, stabilising pressures on both sides, it can exercise its nonaligned policy.

It has become known, on the other hand, that in the last 48 hours the principal western countries have taken a series of precautionary and restricted measures of alert which also cover Greek territory, after special agreements with the Greek Government. Rumania has also taken corresponding measures.

Actually, since 1948, when Tito removed his country from the Soviet wagon, Moscow-Belgrade relations have never been good. The Yugoslavs have always been afraid that at some moment, perhaps after Tito, the Soviets would find the opportunity to seize their country via their devoted Bulgaria. Or perhaps they would try to promote pro-Soviet elements for indirect pressure and control in Yugoslavia.

It is known that Macedonia, which is now divided amongst Greece, Yugoslavia (a federated democracy whose capital is Skopje) and Bulgaria, is also an area of friction amongst these three countries. The descent into wars waters, into

the Mediterranean, into Salonica is the clear pursuit—independent of a change in regimes—of the Russia of the tsars and the Soviet Union. Our country, cultivating the best possible relations with the Soviet Union—which would be excellent if Afghanistan had not created on a worldside scale the concerns which are not, unfortunately, a simple myth—is obligated to be on its guard. This affair has effects on us domestically. I have reasons and information which make me believe that there would already have been an order for the general repatriation of political refugees and the restitution of Greek citizenship to them if there did not exist, well-founded or not, the steadfast idea of those governing that, if the Slavomacedonians of the federated state of Skopje especially, but also others from Bulgaria, returned to our frontier areas, they would be able to create minority and other issues which are undesirable since homogeneity has been achieved in any way whatsoever since the time of the civil war. It must be acknowledged that the way in which homogeneity was achieved was not the most correct. Narratives by old "national army" members (Th. Pentzopoulos' "Tragic Journey" for example) describe the unacceptable manner (to use the mildest characterization) in which we reached homogeneity. Shall we not speak of these things? Agreed, but under the stipulation that we not forget.

The great vision of Rigas [Feraios], who called all the Ottoman Empire's nationalities—even the Turks whom he distinguished from the sultans and their military-political feudalism—the Albanians, Wallachians, Serbs, Bulgarians, Montenegrins, etc., to the creation of a multinational democracy, was not able to be realized. It was torpedoed by the prevalence of the principle of homogeneous nationalities. So we arrived at the creation, with fire and iron, of homogeneous states. A slight deviation, but essentially supported on the same principle, is Yugoslavia. It would be terrible—and a great danger for all of us and a dreadful threat to peace—if after Tito an Afghanistan type invasion ensued.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[Text] Tito's departure from Yugoslavia's political scene in whatever way is something which, even if it is unavoidable, everyone must wish against. But I do not think there will be serious dangers for his country. Tito has laid strong

foundations under the state he leads. With the Union of Yugoslav Communists standing ahead, the people as a whole and all the nationalities are consolidated around the basic principle of unity.

The Yugoslav regime, as it has been formed in the years of Tito, is truly supported by the people. To believe that the system of self-administration which is being applied gives the direction for authentic socialism. Finally, the Yugoslav army is a dynamic, truly people's army, as it has been created since the years of occupation. In other words, all the conditions exist for maintenance of the country's dynamic cohesiveness, overshadowing local opposition. The mechanism of administration which has been created—the country is presided over by representatives of all the nationalities in turn, with a holder of collective power—also contributes towards strengthening cohesiveness.

Tito's Yugoslavia is a strong and exemplary country with an exceptionally great international prestige. The world does not forget that it was one of the founders of the movement of nonaligned countries, on which it continues to exert a mighty influence. Just recently, at the Havana conference, the splintering of the Third World, which was being pressured on many sides, was avoided thanks to Tito's intervention. This movement, which embraces a very great part of humanity, has as a basic principle the independence and mutual respect of nations. Also, Tito did not hesitate to energetically condemn the invasion into Afghanistan. On the other hand, one principle of Yugoslav policy is peaceful coexistence. All these strengthen the international position of Tito's Yugoslavia and reinforces its domestic structure and might.

But what if Tito is withdrawn from the scene? Then, certainly, efforts will be made by many sides to exploit the presumed weaknesses which will emerge. But I think that Yugoslavia will be able to endure, to confront all these corrosive efforts. Certainly, post-Tito Yugoslavia will take measures. It has proved this already: Tito's worsening health a few days ago was enough reason for the whole army to go on alert and the country to be safeguarded. These measures aimed, first of all, at domestic order, but they were also a warning against any future attempt to create problems and threats to Yugoslavia, from any foreign side whatsoever. In other words, they were measures to cut the appetite of any who might want to avail themselves, from within or without, of a special situation in the country.

I believe, however, that Yugoslavia without Tito will be in a position to overcome all these adversities. Overseas can be

assured that it is not going to suffer any unpleasant repercussion. Not even agitation in Macedonia will create problems for Greece. A possible elevation of acrimony in Macedonia will concern Yugoslavia's relations with Bulgaria, not with Greece. So Greeks must not worry about developments in a Yugoslavia without Tito because this country which today follows a policy of sober-mindedness will continue the same policy after Tito and it will maintain its cohesiveness, regime and international relations unshaken.

Tito is characterised as great and he is. Yet he is great not only because of the role he has played in the world and his country but also because of what he leaves behind: a regime on the path of socialism (with self-administration), a country with unshaken national cohesiveness and domestic unity, a firm defensive force and a very great international radiance with the nonaligned movement.

92.7
330: .498

ECONOMIST ANALYZES INFLATION AND ECONOMY

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English , Feb 80 pp 21, 23

[Interview with Mr Lazaros Efremoglou, President of the Athens Chamber of Commerce]

[Text] In an interview with B&F, Mr L. Efremoglou, President of the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry, talks of the country's battle against inflation and the effectiveness of the government's current anti-inflationary measures. Forecasting grave economic prospects for this year he pinpoints inflation, the growing balance of payments deficit and the slow rate of new productive investment as being the major problems to be overcome.

B&F: Inflation was probably the most serious problem faced by the Greek economy in 1979. Do you feel that the government's anti-inflationary measures are sufficient to restrict the rate of increase of inflation in 1980?

Efremoglou: It is true that inflation may be considered as being at the top of the pyramid of the problems that our economy faces today. At the same time, however, it should be stressed that this phenomenon is not the "privilege" of the Greek economy only. It is an international one on which, particularly during 1979, almost all countries of the industrial world focus their attention, even countries with traditionally slow rates of price increase like W. Germany.

Therefore if we take into account the dependence of our economy on other more advanced economies we come to the conclusion that inflation in Greece is due to the import, of both endogenous and exogenous pressures. Considering the latter, for example, we can argue that imported raw material and oil is considerable quantity of which we buy from the spot market where prices in general are higher than those of the EEC countries price increases directly influence the exogenous part of the inflation index. As for the endogenous factors I express the hope that the number of measures taken by the government will bring the results expected. However I believe that apart from a continuous consideration and evaluation of these measures by the authorities, a campaign, aiming at informing the public about the catastrophic consequences of the "inflation spiral" is a must.

An attempt towards facing the problem of "inflationary psychology" is, in my opinion, of utmost importance and should be given absolute priority.

As far as the announcement of new restrictive measures is concerned, I think that a reconsideration, on the authorities' part, of the policy of taking the productive classes by surprise, which is followed sometimes, is necessary.

RA: It has been suggested that in its efforts to fight inflation the government has placed insufficient emphasis on economic development as a whole. What are your views on this?

Efremoglou: The fight against inflationary pressures is one of the most important stabilizing factors of the economic life of a country. This is because the lack of monetary and economic stability, not only does it prevent the undertaking of development and investment projects but it also creates serious difficulties as far as production and economic programming are concerned, because of the inability under such circumstances, to forecast future demand to control production costs and to determine product prices.

On the other hand the fight against inflation should be designed in such a way so that not to drain our attempts towards economic development. The support of development programs in a period of international economic changes is necessary, today in particular, because of the entry of our country in the EC.

Any delay or underestimation of the importance of our attempt for economic development means that the ability of our economy to face an increasing competition will be limited.

Our attempt for development and the fight against inflation are not necessarily two opposing forces from which one has to be selected. I believe in other words, that a balanced combination of both is the optimum step to take.

RA: Do you feel that the government's current incomes policy evenly spreads the burden of fighting inflation on wages and profits?

Efremoglou: The Government's new economic measures for halting inflation, although strict, are nevertheless necessary. This is because our efforts against inflation and the achievement of an internal and external equilibrium of the economy necessitates the pursue of a careful incomes policy and a more complete profit control in order to maintain at satisfactory levels both the liquidity of the economy and the rate of our economic development.

Wage rate increases should follow increases in productivity and in no case should be higher than the current inflation rate, as it happened for example during the previous four years. Thus higher wages and salaries contributed to increases of labour costs as well as to an increase in total consumption and demand and this in turn, to some extent, to inflationary pressures.

[redacted]

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS STATISTICS REPORTED

[illegible] BUSINESS & FINANCE in English : Vol. XX, pp. 1-X

[illegible] The Bank of Greece recently published the latest in [illegible] balance of payments figures for 1979. The widening trade and current account deficits respectively $3,16 billion and $2,180 million reached new record levels and exceed in first-ever persistently critical and gives increases regarding the external position of Greece.

In this connection [illegible] Looking at the Bank's figures [illegible] it can be seen that despite the large deficits, reserve remains enlarged while new funds, both private and public, have exceeded the amounts of the old ones.

The favourable development is due to the high rate of capital inflows [illegible] by private entities, supplier credits, correspondent [illegible] inflows for the purchase of real estate, etc., and also to the high [illegible] errors and omissions entry. This large errors and omissions [illegible], which is in a large extent attributed to unrecorded capital inflows, [illegible] reduced the need for official borrowing to cover the current account deficit and the amortization of old loans.

Investment Import Plan

In the period from January to December 1981 new capital funds by 34 persons to a magnitude 50,20 million. Greeks capital, at 693 million, registered an all time record. This considerable increase is due principally to [illegible] factors.

1) Trials in higher oil prices. OPEC imports had already reached 32 billion by December of last year reduced to 21,20 billion by December of the previous year.

2) [illegible] to investments in exploitation of higher prices and results [illegible].

3) Results in higher world prices that result all kind of imported products,

[illegible]

Table [illegible] Balance of payments (millions of dollars)

[illegible] November [illegible]

	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

BUILDING ACTIVITY, STATISTICS REPORTED

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English [illegible] pp 19-2[illegible]

[Text]

[illegible]

[illegible]

The development of investments in housing, as it emerges from the data of the National Accounts, is shown in Table 2 [illegible] almost half of the previous year [illegible] during the next four years of high rates, which accounts for such small increases in total gross investments of fixed capital as were registered in that period.

[illegible]

[illegible]

TABLE 1

CHANGES IN BUILDING ACTIVITY
(volume according to building licences)

Year	Percent change over previous year
[illegible]	19.4
[illegible]	— 5.1
[illegible]	8.1
[illegible]	33.7
[illegible]	12.0
[illegible]	—43.4
[illegible]	23.9
[illegible]	8.7
[illegible]	23.4
[illegible]	16.7

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of Greece.

The need and demand for housing

The factors which in the long term determine the need and consequently condition the demand for housing in all countries are population growth and the increase in income, which is reflected in the improvement of the standards of living. It is the latter factor of the two which plays the principal role in Greece in maintaining the very high rates of demand for housing during the last few decades. The population is increasing at very low rates and this is to a very great extent due to emigration. The slow growth and consequently the low growth rate of the need for new housing, due to a consequence of economic growth and the improvement of the income situation of increasing sections of the population, there has been a corresponding change in demand which turns to higher quality housing. This factor is still operating today irrespective of the requirements of merely replacing old housing and is also a more important role during the last period decade, this factor operating after all in all countries.

To the extent of which demand for housing reflects a development of the need for accommodation and for the improvement of its quality, it must be in a certain ratio to the number of new households which are being added to the population. The number of new [illegible] taking place each year is regarded as the main index for the assessment of the need for new accommodation. From this point of view it is interesting to look at the data of Table 2 which show the changes on the one hand in the number of marriages on the other in the number of new housing units during 1959-76.

The number of new housing units each year is more than twice as large than that of the number of marriages during each of the five years up to 1973. The difference goes down sharply in 1974 but then goes up again on a new upward phase of building activity starting in 1975. If one also takes into account the number of dwellings which are built without licences, the difference between the two magnitudes is found to be larger than that shown on Table 2.

In order to assess the role of the need for accommodation as determined by population changes acting as demand factor it is useful to make a comparison with other countries. The last OECD report on economic developments in France in 1973 publishes statistical data like those of Table 2 which show that the difference between the two magnitudes (number of marriages and number of new dwellings) are much smaller than those in Greece, even during the period after 1973. It should be noted that the needs for the replacement of old dwellings in France are also large so that this source of requirement is not the main cause of the difference.

TABLE 2

CHANGES IN INVESTMENTS IN DWELLINGS

Percent change over previous year on the basis of constant prices at

Year	Total investments in fixed capital	Investments in dwellings	Investments in dwellings as percent of total fixed capital investments
1960	19.6	19.4	33.0
1970	— 8.8	-10.0	27.0
1971	14.0	19.8	29.3
1972	19.4	26.7	32.2
1973	7.7	2.0	30.5
1974	—13.6	-18.1	26.8
1975	0.1	19.0	29.4
1976	7.1	2.0	27.4
1977	8.1	19.9	31.1
1978	9.0	15.7	33.0

Source: National Accounts of Greece and Report of Governor of Bank of Greece 1978

Other factors determining the size of investment

A number of other factors create additional demand for investments in buildings, irrespective of the needs for accommodation which are defined on the basis of a rational model of conduct. [illegible] to population changes and replacement of [illegible]. Finally, it should be noted that even demand for owner-occupied dwellings exceeds the size which would follow from a rational model based on the degree of development and the general income situation of the country. One recent deviation is the extent of demand for country cottages which is marked by a rapid rise during the last few years. Another manifestation of this kind are the investments for the construction of additional family dwellings in various areas of the country. The building which is usually [illegible] by the higher-than-necessary commendation from the point of view of the position of the [illegible] developed into a sizable magnitude which contributes to the high rate of increase of expenditure for investments in dwellings.

Overcrowding for productive investments

The excessive tendency towards investments in buildings is certainly reflecting the overcrowding for productive investments and is not unrelated to the general trend towards overconsumption. Large sections of the population are trying to acquire housing which may be characterized as luxurious not only on the basis of the general living level of the country but also in comparison with models of other countries that are much more prosperous than Greece. Finally, a factor which certainly contributes to the continued high level of investments in building during the last phase of inflation are the slower progress of the economy, the desire to safeguard savings against devaluation.

Short-term implications

The high level of building prices, as a significant inflationary factor under the conditions which marked the economy after 1974, investments in buildings create incomes which imply a demand of this amount without a corresponding increase of the supply of consumer goods. At the same time, they exert pressure on the market of building materials which entail an increase of imports and consequently on the total income in the building

TABLE 3

MARRIAGES AND NEW DWELLINGS

Year	Number of marriages	Number of new dwellings	Ratio (1) / (2)
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

TABLE 4

MARRIAGES AND NEW DWELLINGS IN FRANCE

[illegible]	Number of marriages	Number of new dwellings	Ratio of [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible] despite the abrupt fall in 1971 and the fact that before 1970 building [illegible], was below the level of 1973. The latter shortage is getting more [illegible] and leads to increases in the real wages which are very great and continue. [illegible] to the increase of [illegible]. This [illegible] factor, the consumer spending [illegible] of income groups which in any [illegible] have a high propensity towards consumption and, even more important, it contributes to the increase in demand for certain imported goods. The rapid increase in imports of motor cars is to a large extent [illegible] by imports of [illegible] engaged in the construction sector. On the other hand, the increase of wages in the building sector exerts corresponding pressure over the whole construction sector and also influences [illegible] the trends in the other sectors. [illegible] with the fast rapid of increase of real wages much range than the increase of productivity. But must it be forgotten that in the building sector incomes are created to a large extent in effect take the form of profits, and not that of wages.

Long-term implications

The high level of investments in building during the present years of inflation and of decline of profits, the investment is economically over-ripe the unfavourable long-term implications of their high share in the total gross investment of their capital. The immediate effect of strengthening the rate of economic growth is counter-balanced by inhibiting effects on the [illegible] which means laying the economy on sound foundations of a productive momentum. The economic growth of the construction sector in general and in particular of the building sector is reinforcing the parasitic character and increases the deviation from the model which would ensure permanent possibilities for self-sustained growth. The difference between the level of satisfaction of consumer needs and the production infrastructure is increasing, becoming obvious. If until now it was possible to improve continuously the standards of living with the non-durable infrastructure this will not be true during the next phase of an economic development. Economic policy very rarely encouraged building activity after the first post-war decade. But rather have there been attempts of exerting indirect or influence by means of administrative measures such as rent, the privilege of granting building licences to this purpose. Other countries which during the last inflationary years were of experiencing great difficulties to maintain fairly successful, restricted investments or favouring by such measures.

[illegible] SECTION [illegible]

DAILY

[illegible] TEXT TO FOLLOW--Minister for EC Affairs Anninos met in The Hague with Dutch Prime Minister Van Agt. Anninos and the members of the Greek delegation also met with Dutch Minister of Agriculture Van der Stee and senior officials of the ministry. The issues discussed concerned Greece's accession to the EC and the implementation of the community system in the country's agricultural sector. Tonight, Greece's Ambassador in The Hague, Konstantopoulos, will give a dinner which will be attended by Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs Van der Klaauw and Dutch Minister for Agriculture Van der Stee. Anninos will depart The Hague tomorrow for Brussels where he will meet with members of the European Committee. [Text] [ATTN125] Athens Domestic service in Greek 1050 GMT 27 Feb 82 AT

TALKS ON EFTA AGREEMENT--An open or secret decision will EC member it will implement the preferential agreements the community has signed with EFTA, that is, the European Free Trade Association. Negotiations for this purpose began yesterday in Brussels. The first meeting was held with the representatives of Switzerland. The EC has never authorized or ask that special measures favoring Greece come into effect in connection with the control of the import of certain commodities in addition to the well-known list of EC community [illegible] products on which the community has accepted controls when imported by new country. [Text] [ATTN125] Athens Domestic service in Greek 0500 GMT 27 Feb 82 AT

[illegible] [illegible]

SAKHAROV EXILE SPURS FOUNDING OF SOCIETY TO AID EAST BLOC DISSIDENTS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 24 Jan 80 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Dissidents' Society Founded in Connection With Arrest of Sakharov"]

[Text] Yesterday a dissidents' society was founded in Reykjavik to assist dissidents in East Bloc countries, behind the Iron Curtain, in the struggle for freedom. Its task will be to collect and disseminate information on this freedom struggle among Icelanders and gain a following for the cause of the dissidents in Iceland. The chairman of the society is Ingi Hans Thordardottir, a generalist school teaching in Akranes, and [illegible] and others in the society are Gudmundur Heidar Frimannsson, B.A., secondary school teacher in Akureyri, Oskar Einarsson, medical student, and chairman of Vaka, the society of democratic students, Fredrik Fridriksson, trade student, and chairman of the Society of Freethinkers, and Gunnar Thorsteinsson, secondary school student. The post office box of the society is [illegible], 121 Reykjavik.

"It is clear why we have founded this society," said the chairman of the dissidents' society, Ingi Hans Thordardottir, in a conversation with MORGUNBLADID. "By its arrest of the most important leader of the dissidents in the East Bloc countries, Andrei Sakharov, the Soviet Government shows that it disregards those universal human rights which we in the Western nations take for granted. It breaks the agreement which it made recently with the Western democratic countries, the Helsinki accord. This most recent event hammers the truth in on that there is still a dictatorship in the East Bloc countries. It shows us that we cannot trust the rulers in the Kremlin in any way. The violence is naked. We of the Western nations cannot, for reasons of conscience, turn a deaf ear to the call of those who fight for freedom and human rights in their countries." [illegible] said that when he came to Iceland, the best help which the dissidents could receive would be incessant criticism, ceaseless dissemination of information about what is taking place in East Bloc nations."

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] (Reuters) - [illegible] on Monday [illegible]

[illegible] (Reuters) - [illegible] in Iceland on Jan 04 p.m.

"[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] about how [illegible] with this [illegible] of values. How [illegible] of the [illegible] are continually turned on and it costs much effort and difficulty to provide the needed way value in such an environment.

Question: How much should taxes be increased [illegible] considering [illegible] terms, in your view?

Taxes to the Atlantic 10-15 Percent Too Low

Answer: Taxes need to be increased by 10-15 percent and if they are [illegible] then the situation today would be entirely different than it is.

Question: Is it not the tendency for taxes to rise in spite of [illegible] opposition?

Answer: We are hoping that this situation will not continue and we certainly [illegible] of a sentiment towards increased taxes but we have failed to [illegible] the same can be said about fuel cost increases. But the other is an [illegible] increase announcements.

In [illegible], among other things, to look beyond these facts while the situation is negative. They ask why we fly people, and foreigners at that, for tax [illegible] taxes. We answer that if we gave up flying foreigners the operations of the company would be even less advantageous than before. The final point is that the company should then [illegible] in these operating components that can [illegible] even though every effort was made to run them down to [illegible]. We have profited from distributing fixed costs over a variety of [illegible]. A good example is the Dallas/Fort Worth airfield since the most important thing [illegible] is not whether one or many aircraft land the same morning because of airport [illegible] personnel is needed for one aircraft. The company has been in this [illegible] competition with much fuller and experienced in air service that large [illegible] and to question. We intend to use this experience as a [illegible] to [illegible] and then [illegible] competition on that basis and the point of the [illegible] hubs to boost [illegible] and [illegible] on that.

Average Pay: 7.0 Million Germs Will the Company Lose Them

Question: How it is not only the interest of employees of the company to [illegible] [illegible] that the company stays on a firm footing, but also of the [illegible] people as a whole. What, for example, does Lufthansa pay in [illegible] personnel?

Answer: Expenses in personnel last year were 991 million marks in the state and the contributions in payroll taxes to the pension fund, as mentioned [illegible] entry, and expenses [illegible] million marks to various employee funds. [illegible] million marks were returned by the company in sales taxes. 481 million marks [illegible] taxes, and to the 1[illegible] employees on the payrolls last year, [illegible] billion marks of wages were paid. 7.0 million marks, or 7.0 million marks, is the average per employee. This means that [illegible] paid [illegible] million marks, or 2.4 million marks, in direct payments last year.

[illegible] [illegible] AFTER MEETING WITH GOVERNMENT

[illegible] [illegible] in Italian 19 Jan 82 pp 10-11

[Report by Lucian Ashe: "Considerations and Reflections on the Labor Situation and the Fighting Decisions of the Meeting With the Administration"]

[text] Rome, 7 January 1982. The assignment given me by the Secretariat of the Union Federation is not an easy to present a report--since this is the continuation of a session of the previous committee meeting which opened with a report by Comrade Lettieri--but rather to present an update on the situation following the meeting with the administration on 29 December; as well as the events thereafter, plus, of course, some comments on the current situation.

The 29 December meeting--as we all know by now--was disappointing and we unanimously considered the outcome to be negative because, in reality, beyond the question of pensions which seemed to have been resolved more favorably than it actually was since the cabinet on the next day did not even take it up, beyond, I said, the problem of pensions, on which a rather positive solution was presented, actually nothing else happened. That is the truth, if we want to be clear and sincere.

I would like to give you a few examples without spending too much time on an analysis of the results of the meeting which by now are widely known as a result of the reports that were printed in the press, as well as the announcements on radio and television during the days thereafter. Let us take up the utility rates, for example, which constitute a rather hot topic. In other words, an issue on which the administration is really not serious. In answer to an administrative or legislative character, the steps we were ready to support in the course of the earlier meetings regarding telephone and electric power rates, have the administration thought that it could adopt decisions without realizing that our readiness to go along was tied to essential reciprocity regarding, for example, the level of investments in the electric power industry, the [illegible] of manpower in the telephone recovery, and concerning this latter sector, also an

starting with an analysis of the real situation which the [illegible] move away [illegible] from its own original observation point.

The United Federation has within it workers and leaders who are placed in all parties within the democratic lines; and this constitutes a guarantee for autonomy, impartiality, and originality of the action and its decisions.

We are fully aware of this unity and we are its alert guardian; we therefore feel that we are not violating but, on the contrary, protecting it when we turn to the country and to the political forces by expressing not just a judgment of blame on the dramatic nature of the political situation, but also when we ask for a guide who will able to cope with the crisis we are going through.

When we state, stressing the essential values which keep a nation together as a united society, when disruptive threats threaten to prevail, and when the working class itself is having trouble in exercising its function as the historical axis of the defense of democracy and the promotion of progress, then all political and social forces, which sustain that democracy and that progress, must together commit themselves to an effort aimed at the renewal and salvation of the country.

We [illegible] union leaders furthermore know that defending threatened democracy and liberty, achieving a policy of employment and growth under present conditions of domestic and international crisis is also the only guarantee for a valid defense of the interests of the workers.

We are the representatives of a segment of Italian society, of the economically weakest segment, especially in the underprivileged sectors, among young people without jobs, among the unemployed in the South without any hope of getting jobs, but we also represent that part of society which has so many enormous interests to defend and which wants to defend them with firmness; from this segment of society we today get a reminder of the seriousness of the crisis and an indication, a political will which is aimed at resolving it.

In making ourselves the promoters of this appeal, through entirely unusual initiatives, we are asking the entire country, the political and cultural forces which have the duty to orient and guide it, to become aware of the state of affairs, to proclaim old and new untruth legitimate thoughts on the ideological level and to open an area of understanding which will create consensus around a severe but effective political leadership. A program of restoration and renewal, a program for new efficiency in the management of public affairs, a clear and selfless way of governing--these are the conditions necessary for getting out of the crisis and returning Italy to the road of progress.

We will say these same things tomorrow to some other administration which might run the country because the problem is not just connected with the

The important thing is in practice to express--through concrete initiative--a policy of class unity and an effort really to contribute to breaking out of this crisis.

In this respect, on fiscal questions likewise, we had some significant examples of action and contribution by the labor union movement, the most significant one comes to us from Turin. An agreement was drawn up at Turin between the regional labor union organizations and the financial administration authorities, with the participation of the minister of finances, to put together instruments and committees that would conduct a survey on incomes so as to identify the categories of citizens among whom this survey should be conducted first of all, ahead of others.

I believe that this agreement should be made known to the entire Italian labor union movement because it can be extended also to other regions. In this way, the labor union would remain involved in the fight against inflation, in general, and also in the fight against tax evasion, but it would not demand for itself, for employed workers, who are so heavily hit by the tax burden, any special privileges, provided everybody else pays up. We asked for tax exemptions which we did not get and the administration was wrong and is wrong, but even in this situation, we propose to act as a positive force that wants to help fight against a scourge which is one of the worst that can strike at the fabric of Italy's social and moral unity, the scourge of tax evasion.

We said "no" and we confirm our strong "no" regarding the revision of the sliding scale which now only covers 60 percent or 70 percent of the purchasing power of wages, also because that would mean blaming the workers and the wages for being the main cause of inflation. Well, you can read yesterday's papers and Great Britain, in December, had a rate of inflation of 18 percent. Great Britain does not have a sliding wage scale. In France it went up from 13 to 14 percent and France likewise does not have any sliding scale on wages. The fact is that this is a favorite target in order to nibble away at one of the fundamental gains of the labor union movement and of the Italian workers.

What are the decisions, then? There will be an 8-hour strike on 15 January for all worker categories. For public utilities, I said before, we propose a shorter participation time, limited to the first few hours of work shifts for transportation workers. I believe that the practical ways of this participation by public utilities are not something we can decide in the course of our work within the steering committee right now; we can determine them tomorrow for the individual worker categories.

We furthermore propose the adoption of an initiative on the fight against terrorism. The anniversary of the murder of the worker Guido Rossa by the terrorists comes on the 24th. A mass demonstration will be held at Genoa and we think that it would be a good thing for this mass demonstration to be attended not only by the top leadership of the federation but also by workers representatives and delegates from other provinces and regions of Italy.

C15. RESEARCH ON ASPECTS OF TRADE UNIONISM SUMMARIZED

Union Development in Italy

Annex INQUISTI DEL LAVORO in Italian 1- Jan 80 p 5

[Article by Guido Baglioni: "Unionization in Italy"]

[Text] This "special" issue along with brief remarks by the authors presents some of the results of the study on "Unionization in Italy" which will shortly be published in two volumes by "Edizioni Lavoro." This is the first in a series of studies currently in progress at the CIS. [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] research center in Florence. Research on the development of unions is very important. Among other things, it demonstrates the strength of Italian unionism, a unique "mode," in Europe, rooted in society and in places of employment.

This research study is the first to be completed among those currently in progress at the Florence research center as provided for under a research project drawn up at the beginning of 1978.

It studies the progress of unionization in Italy. It proposes to make an analytical contribution--in other words, a competent, methodologically supported, not ideological or not propagandistic contribution--on the quantitative dynamics of the labor union experience, on the factors determining it, and on the political organizations which the labor unions operate specifically.

This research study as a matter of fact is concerned with Italy's unionization during the period of 1950-197?, concentrating its emphasis on the two major confederations, the CIS and the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor].

In addition to a detailed and overall examination of labor unionization and its relationships with the political-cultural components, on the one



[illegible] see next page

[See figure on preceding page]

Figure 1. Percentage share of workers out of total [illegible] and [illegible] employed retirees (1970-1980-1987-1997). The share of the various sectors out of the total registered members changes over the years, indicating the ratio in the [illegible] while the tertiary public sector can take part in the [illegible]. In addition to the industrial sector, key: --agriculture, .--.-industry, .-.-tertiary public sector, .---tertiary private sector.

Economy, Labor Conflicts, Institutions

[Name illegible] in Italian in Jan 97, p. 1

[Article by Guido [illegible]: "Relations between the Economy, Conflicts, and Institutions"]

[Text] The first problem we face in this study is how to interpret the changes in the social nature of Italian unionism. The initial approach to the problem consists of an analysis of changes in the quantitative capacity of the labor union movement's representation (in other words, the analysis of the development of unionization rates and the percentage shares out of the various sectors and the different geographical areas present in each of the confederations and in both of them as a whole); the second point taken into consideration relates to the significance of the cultural and political traditions in the support for the [illegible] and the [illegible]. In the third and last point, finally, we try to interpret whether and to what extent the progress of the business cycle can contribute to an explanation of the variations in unionization.

The analysis on the first point led to two principal results:

(a) over the past decade, the Italian labor unions saw their quantitative representation capacity rise to levels associated with a country featuring mature capitalism in a context of great social and political turbulence, following a wave of years during which the unionization levels were somewhat reduced;

(b) this growth is taking place to an extraordinary degree, following the initial development in industry, in our "typical" sectors of labor union control in western countries. Italy has its maximum unionization in agriculture and its unionization rate in public employment exceeded only by Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries.

All of this enables us to assume that there is a plurality of interests represented here, not all of which are always homogeneous, plus a plurality of labor union action and organization; this makes the problem of coordination and of creating a homogeneous image of the Italian labor unions very difficult. And here is a very complex aspect: the labor unions almost doubled their organizational strength over a period of 20 years, whereas,

Recruiting Policies, Membership, Analysis

Case [illegible] in Italian to Jan 81 pp on]

[Article by Ian Negelio: "The Recruiting Policies"]

[Text] In this part of our study we look at the process of unionization from the viewpoint of the labor union as such. Now, it is obvious that, from this angle, unionization appears as an absolutely central organizational objective. This is not only because the organization's financial resources will depend almost completely on the membership figures, even in part because the degree of legitimation, which the union is given within the political system, as well as its strength in exerting pressure upon opposing organizations, will also depend on its ability to get support. In other words, the membership level represents the chief indicator of a union's strength and its development in terms of time appears to be an important indicator as to the degree of consensus which the labor union gets among its rank and file. A union therefore will be driven to increase the membership ratio out of the total number of unionizable individuals as much as possible, even though this certainly should not be taken as a mathematical axiom.

How will this happen? We might imagine that a union's "success" will be simply tied to its ability to protect the interests of the workers it represents through constant negotiations and other forms of political action. On the other hand, as we know, in the Italian situation contractual gains are not applied exclusively to the registered membership. Hence, the ability to get explicit support for the organization cannot be based exclusively on the paid personnel, no matter how effective it may be. As for the rest, the organization will nevertheless be interested in holding on to its support even when the "successes" are of a lesser degree.

The union therefore will have to invest resources (both human and financial) to promote unionization. In theories, the union will develop a specific recruiting policy of its own which will not necessarily coincide with [word illegible] points in the broad sense. By "recruiting policy" we mean the type and quantity of "benefits" or advantages which the organization offers to anyone who signs up with it [in other words, things which, we might say, "are exchanged" in return for registered membership], the effective manner in which these benefits are offered [in other words, the organizational efforts that are made to reach the unionizable individuals and to maintain relations with already registered workers], as well as the necessity of the organization's involvement.

Now, then, are the types of recruiting policies specifically implemented by the labor unions over the past 10 years [in other words, during the years of greatest expansion of the Italian union]? In what ways were they different or to what extent were they similar from one category to the next, in various situations due to environmental conditions

[illegible] struggle, individual care, welfare assistance] are becoming increasingly more equal among the various confederations, beyond the traditional differences. Naturally, as I said before, there are "ideal" models which in reality do not come up in the pure state; they represent three different forms of [illegible] approaching the relations with the workers and each of them requires different resources and has different consequences.

Regarding the other point mentioned earlier--the point dealing with the low level of interest in recruiting on the part of the organizations--it appears sufficiently justified if we keep in mind the high degree of union presence which has been reached in Italy over the past 10 years and the effectiveness of union protection measures (proxy over the same period of time). On the other hand, there are also widespread signs of an upswing in attention being given to membership levels today as compared to several years ago. Thus there seems to be a spread of renewed concern in "keeping close tabs" on the workers by introducing new services that will help take care of the [illegible] of the workers also outside the place of work. Above all, in Italy, we have a more accentuated expression of unionization which is referred to as "fighting" unionism.

After the long phase of expansion, the unions today therefore face the problem of how to maintain and at the same time improve relations with the registered members, beyond the facilitating mechanisms, such as the mechanism of the [illegible]



[Caption and key on following page] Figure 1.

[illegible] (continued from previous page)

[illegible]



[illegible]



[illegible]

The unionisation rates in the sectors of agriculture and industry in [illegible] in the first case, reached the extremely high rate of 89.3%. In contrast in the other case the overall total was 40.0%. We thus have a considerable increase in the unionisation rate in agriculture whereas we register a drop of several points in industry.



Figure 3. [illegible] and [illegible] unionisation rate in the public tertiary sector (1950-1977).



Figure 4. [illegible] and [illegible] unionisation rates in the private tertiary sector (1950-1977).

In the case of the public tertiary sector, the unionisation rate rose from 20.0% to 40.3%, in the specific case of the [illegible], it grew from 9.8% to 21.0%. The share of the [illegible] dropped from 16.8% to 17.6%, in other words, a slight loss. In the public tertiary sector on the other hand there was a slight increase from 34.3% to 34.6%.

Role of Union Membership Outlined

Rome QUESTO E' IL SINDACATO in Italian 1-Jan 67 p 1

[Article by Mario Deperu and Guido Barchielli: "The Role of the Militants"]

[Text] The figure of the militant, such as it emerges in the survey, is marked by a definite series of references to a scale of values which is rather well developed since it represents the ideal horizon within which we find the specific actions undertaken in specific situations.

The persistent interest in fundamental values (autonomy, liberty, solidarity, etc.) and, in some cases, their idealistic overestimation appear to counterbalance any possible skepticism, fatigue, or disappointments deriving from the difficulty of expressing the union organization's commitment in support of the workers in the form of concrete action and behavior. The union organization furthermore represents a resource for the individual subject in legitimizing his own personal effective involvement beyond the more immediate demands deriving from his own situation as a worker. But this strong frame of correspondence between the social image of the militant and the role effectively played in the various worker situations in reality turns out to be much more articulated and complex. First of all we have the consideration--on the part of the militants interviewed--of a rather modest central degree (less so at any rate, than anticipated) of the labor union experience as such within the context of elements that make up the area of operation= significant, an area into which the member can project their own personal and social factors.

Moreover it is also interesting to note the link with the individual's own group of workers on the job, made up of registered members and non-affiliated members, in other words, the group for which the member somehow assumes "protection and care."

In line with this point--although with emphasis on guaranteeing the presence of the organization at the place of work--there is a tendency to give preference, at least according to a subjective scale of values, to a role in terms of providing inspiration and social impetus rather than rigorously executing "professional" tasks.

Looking next at the militant as a member of an organizational structure (the labor union in other words), it seems that the climate perceived by the majority of those interviewed is such as to discourage any excessive personal investment in the area of worker strategy pursued by the union. On the other hand, the member there is a decline probably in large segments of the union membership in terms of readiness to engage in ideological support that will be of vast significance to the organization. It becomes difficult to be amazed over the fact that the militants covered by the survey on the one hand tend to sacrifice a considerable portion of their own energies and their own resources to labor union activities at the same

[illegible] concerning however that they are not getting enough out of this as they might not think it continuing this sort of effort for any length of time.

In summary, the message that seems to filter from the labor union structure to the militant is a message of a generic readiness to act in a series of real situations which, by virtue of their physical and logistic fragmentation, would not be easy for the organization to find out and to control. The discomfort expressed by those interviewed in finding their own position in the structure as compared to the other components underscores the feeling that the militant basically represents more of a labor union "asset" (the rank and file, democratic authorities, contact with the workers) rather than a component of an organizational structure.

Finally, regarding the recruiting problem, we can say that--although we did take into account the differences emerging in our studies (especially among the worker categories examined)--recruiting activities constitute a marginal part of their labor union efforts for the militants interviewed.

Even when they do get a request from the organization to participate, this is not a strongly-felt urging and it does not persuade them to implement specific programmed and verifiable worker strategies in the pursuit of a particular goal.

Instead, there is a great deal of trust in the automatic nature of labor union membership mechanisms, a vision of reality which primarily considers the relationship of personal trust, of human contact, which most of the time is considered necessary and sufficient for the subsequent recruiting of new members into the organization. The objective of getting new members in fact is everywhere considered to be important by the subject interviewed for the sake of the organization's continuity; but in the majority of cases there is also, on the one hand, a component in terms of relations which seems to favor the indirect approach through daily personal contact and, on the other hand, there is a connotation of value which holds that registering a worker involves not only getting another member for the organization but means that another worker has become convinced of the need for joining the labor union movement.

[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] CONFINDUSTRIA ENERGY CONFERENCE SEEN AS UNPRODUCTIVE

[illegible] CONQUISTE DEL LAVORO in Italian 16 Jan 80 pp 1-2

[Article by Cesare Delpiano: "The Meetings with Confindustria"]

[Text] The negotiating meeting with Confindustria [General Confederation of Italian Industry] on 9 January, concerning the country's serious energy situation, to the [illegible] has produced no results. Through the voice of its president Carli, Confindustria blocked any possible serious "in-depth" discussions on the immediate questions connected with the energy situation. The motivations given by Carli for this delaying tactic and perhaps also for not continuing the meeting, as we know, were as follows: the general strike announced for 21 January 1980 in which Confindustria did not wish to be "involved" as far as the administration was concerned and, as a new aspect since it was not included in the joint letter sent to the administration, the review of the sliding scale with the "breakdown" of the direct and indirect repercussions of petroleum product price increases. We quite openly explained to Confindustria the significance, scope, and content of the 21 January strike as an initiative and as an event staged not by the labor unions since we ourselves are preoccupied with a "forced" interpretation, such as the one provided by Confindustria and since a discussion with the employers in no way takes the place of a discussion with the administration. In talking to Confindustria we furthermore had to and we still have to look into the possibility of arriving at joint guidlines on the energy issue.

Regarding the sliding scale, the declaration made on 19 of CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions], and UIL [Italian Union of Labor], was issued firmly to stress its own position, its dissimilation toward discussing its revision; it is therefore inevitable to clear the deck of any anticipation as to discussions on this issue. This did not implicate and does not implicate freedom for Confindustria to talk about the situation in its documents and statements. What should or can must be made perfectly clear is that the union does not want to be "involved" in a discussion about it, and therefore cannot be a subject for negotiation.

At this point, the meeting bogged down. The CGIL-CISL-UIL federation included an energy program in its part of the document. Confindustria in turn indicated that it might send such a paper shortly to the Unions' Federation. A new meeting has not been scheduled so far. The meeting of 8 January was called a preliminary discussion meeting.

A few political evaluations are now in place. It must be emphasized that we were able to observe a kind of dispersal within Confindustria, an unexpected change in position, a kind of turning back. It is probable that there might be strong pressure within Confindustria from the major powerful groups and that there might also be a lack of autonomy which can be expressed in conflicts, contradictions and uncertainty going so far as to working out the reasons adopted on 8 January for not going into an open confrontation with the labor unions--with which one should not talk but toward which one should be essentially punitive.

After having sent the letter to the government (on the seriousness of the petroleum issue, on the need for a medium-term energy program, on the points that should have been discussed during the 8 January meeting between Confindustria and the labor unions), it furthermore seemed to us to be incorrect suddenly to introduce and explosive argument, such as the one about the sliding scale having to do with income redistribution.

This adds up to serious responsibility for delays which can arise in the production system, with serious consequences in terms of employment. The atmosphere of conflict can thus become worse. These responsibilities certainly cannot in any way be blamed upon the labor union which was ready immediately and thoroughly to negotiate, on the one hand, with the Administration and, on the other hand, with the employers. We can only see the government and the employers to modify their respective positions and to tackle the real problems while abandoning tactics which only look like playing politics or which reflect a do-nothing attitude. Internal conflicts, difficulties which do not involve the labor union but which have an effect on it, difficulties which are supposed to be shifted to the workers, reducing their power and their commitment.

Finally once again we believe it necessary to stress and forcefully to revive the demand to the effect that (in keeping with the general policy expressed through recent combined directives, to which the CISL gave strong support in order to direct and to participate in the debate and the decisions) it is necessary, on the enterprise and territorial level, to launch the initiative action springing from this place in order to develop a specific negotiating framework with the local public authorities and with the enterprises, within the context of decentralized contract negotiations, regarding the issue of energy and its implications. This is necessary also in anticipation of the regular expiration dates for over-all enterprise contracts. We are as a matter of fact already behind on this point in view of the gravity of prospects. The territorial and worker category structures have been given all necessary documentation.

CONFINDUSTRIA TO CONSIDER DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS FOR SOUTH

Palermo GIORNALE DI SICILIA in Italian 22 Jan 80 p 3

> [Text] Confindustria [General Confederation of Italian Industry] initiative aimed at identifying action to be taken with a view to expiration--on 31 December--of current instruments for providing incentives for the South.

Rome. "Reconnaissance of the South" in collaboration with IASM [Institute for Developmental Assistance to the South] and [illegible] [Studies Center for the Development of the South] and direct promotional effort; these are the two initiatives which Confindustria is working out with a view to the expiration, on 31 December 1980, of all southern-oriented instruments, starting with the Fund.

From this viewpoint, the confederation's national committee for the South invited Minister Di Giesi to attend the coming meeting on 12 February which will take up the agenda topic "Law 183, Reform of Special Intervention and After 1980."

"The 12 February talks with the manufacturers," Di Giesi said, "will undoubtedly introduce useful suggestions on the policy of special action to be taken in the South. For my part I will submit to the entrepreneurs at that time some ideas and proposals as to what I consider necessary in order to solve the southern crisis."

The Confindustria initiatives should however meet with the complete agreement of Minister Di Giesi since, as we know, a little more than a month ago, the Ministry for the South had among other things prepared "mechanisms" for providing economic incentives: this was an initiative by the "promotional observers," that is to say, entrepreneurs who collaborate free of charge with the particular departments in order to facilitate greater dissemination in the world of industry.

The "reconnaissance of the South," which will be ready within 3 months, should become a real "economic map" of the South on which one can base

the promotional effort directed by Confindustria which has already been started, with some associations from the northern part of Italy (Emilia Romagna, Federlombarda, Assolombarda, Unione Industriale di Torino, Unione degli Industriali di Milano) and with the German counterpart of Confindustria which, in the spring, will take a personal look around as part of a visit guided by the Italian confederation, examining the possibilities for industrial investments in Italy's South.

"To revive the development of the South," said Carlo Viviani, chairman of Confindustria's national committee for the South, "it is necessary in the industrial sector, to adjust the labor costs to those levels which will make it possible to sustain the competitive capabilities of southern production establishments and therefore to achieve the practical implementation of a policy of investments and personnel hiring.

"This reduction of labor costs, which would be implemented not only with respect to all that which is new but also everything that exists at this time, so as to make sure that the enterprises are in operation can recover their productivity, can be achieved through greater funding of social burdens and less taxes on products. Another step along these lines would be to exempt useful investments in the South from the tax and to allow immediate amortization of investments.

"These steps," Viviani continued, "carried out under the responsibility of the entrepreneurs, would avoid uncertainty, red tape, and the enormous cost of the government machinery to redistribute ruinous resources which, during future years, would become increasingly scarce."

The other "hot spots" in the southern situation, which Confindustria revealed and which will be analyzed in the introductory report by Viviani at the start of the meeting on the 11th, involve the energy crisis, regular action, and the development of noninduatrial sectors.

According to Confindustria experts, the energy crisis will hit the South harder than the rest of Italy for three basic reasons: because at this time only petroleum is a source of energy here (methane should reach the southern regions only around 1982); because the South is, compared to other parts of the country, a peripheral zone which is rather poorly linked to the richest markets in Italy and Europe and, in view of the inadequate and inoperative railroad network, this would also lead to an increase in transportation costs; because the crisis would also involve the most heavily industrialized areas which would be much less inclined to continue to support the developing areas.

As far as regular administrative action is concerned, this "must not become an alibi for special action" so as to avoid those things that have to be done. Hence the need for greater promptness in terms of authority and specific points of reference, as well as efficient functioning of regular sectors not under administrative government control (credit, transportation, communications, sales).

The third key agent involves the noninvestible sectors which must be adequately developed with particular reference to production services, [illegible] trading, export, credit, development areas, personnel retraining, [illegible] with the entrepreneurs taking over management as a service and not as a manpower center [illegible] and personnel training, agriculture, links with industry and commerce, as well as tourism.

[illegible]
[illegible]

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

Rotterdam [redacted] in Dutch 11 Jan 80 p 1

[Article by our special-economic editors: "CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] and VVD [People's Party of Freedom and Democracy]: Freeze Unavoidable"]

[Text] The Hague, 11 Jan--The government parties CDA and VVD call the cabinet's decision to institute a 2-month wage freeze inevitable. The PvdA [Labor Party] has asked for a discussion of the measure, which is to take place on 22 January. The cabinet announced the wage freeze yesterday after efforts to reach a voluntary interruption in wage negotiations failed in a talk with employer and labor organizations.

The cabinet is now going to work on a policy plan which is suited to the deteriorating economic prospects in the freeze period, which is now legally imposed.

Prime Minister Van Agt announced a policy of rigid wage control and drastic economies in public expenditures. [Several words illegible] in order to prevent the financial deficit from running too high, an additional economy operation of 3 billion guilders would be necessary. The government wants to save itself a total of 4 billion guilders, while 3 billion guilders of the national impoverishment, which it is estimated will amount in all to 7 billion guilders, will be at the expense of business.

CDA group leader Lubbers said that the government can do nothing else but gain time for itself and the social partners to tackle the problem with a change of policy. The VVD thinks that both the government, as well as employers and workers must make sacrifices. According to a first reaction of the liberal group, a national round of restraint is unavoidable.

The PvdA group asked in a letter to Chamber Speaker Dolman that the chamber be informed immediately about the discussion held yesterday in the Labor Foundation, about the nature of the wage freeze and about the considerations which led to this decision. The PvdA also wants information about the results which the cabinet had in view with the decision. The PvdA chamber member Van der [illegible] expressed apprehension about the dangerous results for employment of an economy of 4 billion in government expenditures.

[illegible]
[illegible] 3105

COUNTRY SPECIFIC [redacted] NETHERLANDS

UNIONS REACT TO [redacted] POLICY

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 11 Jan 80 p 9

[Article by our social-economic editors: "Employees on the Minimum Line This Year"]

[Text] The Hague, 11 Jan--All employees will be restricted strictly to the minimum in 1980. The chairman of the FNV [Netherlands Trade Unions Federation], Wim Kok, drew this conclusion from the policy announced yesterday by Prime Minister Van Agt of rigid wage control and drastic reduction of public expenditures. The cabinet now wants to gain time to develop a policy for deteriorating economic prospects with a legally imposed 2 months wage freeze.

The chairman of the FNV, CNV [National Federation of Christian Workers in the Netherlands] and MHP [Union of Intermediary and Senior Staff] considered this freezing of wage negotiation in conflict with the social partners' own responsibility. The employers could understand this measure.

The savings in government expenses will amount to 4 billion guilders this year. Prime Minister Van Agt estimated at 7 billion guilders the national impoverishment which will result because of the decline in the growth of the national income. Three billion of this must be borne by employees, public servants, trend followers [sic] and recipients of social benefits in the form of loss of purchasing power.

Van Agt said yesterday in the discussion held with employers and employees at the Labor Foundation that it is impossible to maintain purchasing power in 1980. He said all types of income must share in the relative impoverishment.

Ability to absorb the loss will be considered in the distribution of the burdens.

According to the prime minister, a saving of [illegible] billion is necessary only to prevent the government finance deficit from running up to about 6.1 percent on a cash basis. It did not appear possible yesterday to reach an agreement on a voluntary wage freeze. Therefore, the cabinet decided on a legal measure for 2 months or as much shorter as is possible. The cabinet wants to resume the conversation with the social partners to see if the wage freeze can be followed by a main agreement.

Labor Black Market

A package of measures is now being prepared. It will be possible to know its main features at the end of this month. The package includes a radical adjustment of budget policy. An income policy will have to be developed which, if no main agreement follows, will be imposed in the form of legal measures. There are also plans to attack the labor black market.

In the package of related measures, it will also be necessary to have provisions to handle bottlenecks on the labor market.

Los said in a reaction to the announced measures that the PvdA rejects both a voluntary as well as an enforced wage freeze. This intervention means that the trade unions are deprived of the right of free negotiation.

Unrest

He thought that this step solves nothing and will lead to social unrest. In his opinion, the wage freeze also helps to aggravate the labor black market. The measure invites retaliation.

The agreement in the dairy industry, where there was a strike for extra pay for heavy and unpleasant work, will be annulled because the wage increases are considered to fall under the wage freeze.

Los wondered how workers with low incomes can be convinced that our economy is so much worse off. He called it unacceptable that the oil companies are getting rich on our natural gas--in 1979 the income amounted to 2 million guilders--while new economies and severe wage restraint are enforced.

The government does not offer any hope for wage increases in 1980. Wage levels, including price adjustment on 1 January will have to be maintained. Price adjustment will be on the

agenda in the middle of the year because the settlement of the energy price increase will be involved in the discussion about that.

The government is placing a dreadful burden on large groups of weaker persons in the community. Kok called that unacceptable. A dangerous downward spiral threatens because the purchasing power of all workers is affected. Kok compared Van Agt's economy policy with Colijn's crisis policy in the thirties.

Like the CNV, the FNV is now going to consider what it must do in the new situation. Monday the FNV Federation Council and the CNV Union Council are going to meet again.

Branches of Industry

Kok kept his distance from the government's desire to reach a main agreement. He said the FNV has not committed itself to that in any way. In his opinion, the emphasis of the negotiation no longer needs to be in the federations, but there where it belongs in the CAO [Collective Labor Agreement] negotiations in the branches of industry and enterprises. The FNV unions will sound out further what is still possible in the different branches of industry.

Van de Moulen, chairman of the CNV also said that only CAO negotiation can be the effective way to let the social partners assume their own responsibility. CAO negotiation is more than concluding a wage agreement. For there must also be negotiations about extra pay for dirty and unpleasant work. That negotiation has now stopped and it is an unnecessary loss of time.

Van Veen, the VNO [Federation of Netherlands Enterprises] chairman, who had opposed a 4 months wage freeze, as the government proposed at the beginning of the conversation, accepts a compulsory 2 months freeze. He understands that the cabinet needs time to work out a policy plan. In principle, the employers are willing to accept a very conservative working conditions policy.

That willingness is encouraged because the government has announced a drastic readjustment of the budget. It is now a question whether the trade unions are willing to adjust their package of demands.

Van der Schalk (PSP) remarked that the cabinet has not indicated in what direction the new economies will be sought. He is angry that there will especially be cuts in government

salaries. There has hardly been any response to a Mail compromise proposal to bring up a 1 percent wage increase for discussion, without it being reflected in social benefits. The outlook after a 2 month wage freeze is nothing, plus extremely low differentials for heavy and unpleasant work.

6499
CSO: 1105

COAL GIVEN GREATER ROLE IN ENERGY PRODUCTION

Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 19 Jan 80 p 11

[Article: "New Coal-Fired Power Stations"]

[Excerpt] Accordingly, a royal decree which has been approved establishes the necessary normative framework to insure that before the end of February 1980 the projects and equipment necessary both to build new coal-fired power plants and to burn coal so that this fuel may be used at other power plants originally slated to burn oil may be contracted for.

This royal decree guarantees the entry into service prior to 1984 to 5,600 additional megawatts of coal-produced electric power, which implies a saving of 8 million tons of crude oil a year and the assurance of employment in the capital goods and construction sectors stemming from the investment of 130 billion Spanish pesetas within 4 years. The power plants which will benefit from this regime immediately are those of Abono, Almeria, Algeciras, La Robla, Guardo and Soto.

On the other hand, government credit is available to cement plants for investments to replace the use of fuel-oil by coal and to those firms which may need to make investments to reduce their energy consumption or to generate their own electric power. The former, making an investment of 20 billion pesetas within 3 years, will be able to save imported oil in the order of 17 million tons.

For those industries which are prepared to make investments to save energy or to generate their own electric power, a government credit line of 10 billion pesetas is being made available. Investment of this magnitude will make it possible to save 800,000 tons of oil annually.

Promotion of Spanish Coal

Regarding the promotion of national coal the credit line created in 1979 for the financing of "stocks" available to thermal power stations has

[redacted] rates by about 10 percent, which makes available total funds of [redacted] billion pesetas for 1966, with [redacted] an element of regulation is introduced making it possible to raise coal production steadily, pending the entry into service of the new planned thermal power plants.

[redacted]
CSO: 9110

STUDY PROVIDES INSIGHT INTO CATALONIA'S INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 18 Jan 80 p 31

[Article by L. V.: "In Catalonia, No New Major Enterprises Will Be Established Until 1985"]

[Text] On the basis of the conclusions of a study realized at the initiative of the Industrial Bank of Catalonia, the Industrial Bank of the Mediterranean, Banesto, Catalonia Bank, and the Union and Industrial Bank of the Pyrenees and whose drafting was been coordinated by Emili Amat, Frederic Miralles and Josep M. Sabater, no new major firms will be established in Catalonia up to 1985-90. Until that time Catalonian economic development will be based on the transfer or expansion of already existing firms. In terms of zones the Barcelona-Girona axis will see the concentration of most new firms to be installed. As for the Lerida zone, sizable agricultural development is proposed for the purpose of subsequently proceeding with major agro-food industrialization.

The study is outlined to a large degree as an inventory and record of territorial resources and as a picture of Catalonian space in relation to its suitability for diversified industrial use and also as regards its needs depending on the subsectors or specific industries themselves. For this purpose a series of variables such as physical conditions of a morphological type, the level of crimes, work opportunities or ease of activities, exposure to floods, vulnerability to pollution, climatic characteristics which impact on industrial activity, accessibility by road and railroad, conditions of service of energy networks (gas, electric power, and so on), the availability of water lines, geographic dynamics, and so on are considered.

Furthermore, consideration was given, in addition to variables associated with the industrial use of space, to those concerning the use of space which said activities represent inasmuch as that space can be used alternatively for high-yield agricultural activity on existing or planned irrigated areas, touristic or leisure activities, or as areas of ecological, cultural or historical conservation.

Six Industrial Zones

In the study the following six zones have been recommended for the establishment of new industrial parks: Figueres-Bascara-Torroella de Fluvia in the Emporda region; La Selva (near Santa Coloma de Farners y Sils); Vilovi del Penedes-El Vendrell in the Penedes region; Montroig del Camp-L'Hospitalet de l'Infant in the Bajo Camp region; Tarragona-Valle-Pla de Santa Maria in the Alt Camp region; and La Semia-Mas de Berberans in the Montsia region. All these zones with the exception of that of the Montsia region are characterized by easy accessibility by road, superhighway or railroad. In contrast the La Semia-Mas de Berberans area is favored by some natural characteristics which would not aggravate the consequences of uncontrolled pollution, a condition which is also found in the Alt Camp region.

In another respect it is indicated that in the Bajo Camp, Penedes and Montsia regions there are gas plants or oil pipelines facilitating the use of this fuel. The study also recommends earmarking land for agricultural use in Figueres and advises about the dangers of pollution in Vilovi del Penedes and the La Selva region.

As for the use of hydric resources the project that has been mentioned affirms that there is only a possibility of using those of Bajo Camp, Tarragona south of the Bisbal del Penedes region and part of the La Selva region.

Scarcity of Industrial Land

Despite the fact that in some areas (Barcelones, Bajo Llobregat, Valles and Maresme) there is a surplus of industrial land, in the rest of Catalonia the supply of industrial land is scant "despite the strange official policy of promoting industrial parks by the National Urban Development Institute." In this connection the project mentioned proposes the establishment of mixed companies for the promotion of industrial parks with the majority of capital coming from the Generalitat, the National Urban Development Institute, and the municipalities and the balance from the funds, affected owners, and professional developers.

In any case, it is found from the survey that industrial parks are adequate only for scantily developed areas. In the opinion of the experts who undertook the study it would be necessary to plan free access in the metropolitan areas as long as this did not cause harm. In brief, it is figured that until 1985 1,471 hectares of industrial land will be needed out of which 626 hectares represent the so-called Region I (Barcelones, Bajo Llobregat, Valles and Maresme).

2662
CSO: 3110

SELECTIVE LIST OF JPRS SERIAL REPORTS

WESTERN EUROPE SERIAL REPORTS

WEST EUROPE REPORT
WEST EUROPE REPORT: Science and Technology

WORLDWIDE SERIAL REPORTS

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Environmental Quality
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Epidemiology
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Law of the Sea
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Nuclear Development and Proliferation
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Telecommunications Policy, Research and Development

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

MARCH · 25 · 80

D.D.